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THE NEW ENERGY GEOPOLITICS?: CHINA, RENEWABLE
ENERGY, AND THE "GREENTECH RACE"
JOEL B. EISEN*
INTRODUCTION
[W]e can't stand by as we let China race ahead to create the clean ener-
gy jobs and industries of the future. We should be developing those re-
newable energy sources, and creating those high-wage, high-skill jobs
right here in the United States of America.-President Barack Obama,
July 27, 20101
In a recent article, I discussed whether China could meet its ambitious
targets for renewable energy deployment. 2 Since the Renewable Energy
Law went into effect in 2006, the Chinese government has implemented
numerous laws and programs designed to encourage renewables. While
China has made strong progress, many factors will influence the nation's
future success in renewable energy deployment, including the need for
consistent pricing policies to stimulate private sector development and the
need to upgrade the country's transmission grid.3
The issue of China's support for renewables has taken center stage in
the United States, thanks to an investigation by the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) that commenced in October 2010.4 That investiga-
tion began with a complaint alleging that China unfairly subsidizes its
greentech industries, in violation of its obligations as a member of the
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author thanks Clayton La-
Forge for invaluable research efforts and Chris Brown, Jim Gibson, and Alexander U. Conrad for
helpful information and comments on drafts; the University of Richmond School of Law for research
grant assistance; and the Chicago-Kent Law Review for the kind invitation to take part in this sympo-
sium issue devoted to energy law issues.
1. Jesse Lee, Another Bipartisan Meeting: Help for Small Business & Energy Reform, THE
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jul. 27, 2010, 2:34 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/27/another-
bipartisan-meeting-help-small-business-energy-reform.
2. See generally Joel B. Eisen, China's Renewable Energy Law: A Platform for Green Leader-
ship?, 35 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. (forthcoming 2010).
3. Id.
4. United States Launches Section 301 Investigation into China's Policies Affecting Trade and
Investment in Green Technologies, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Oct. 15, 2010),
http://www.ustr.gov/node/6223. A full discussion of this investigation under prevailing trade law is
beyond the scope of this article.
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World Trade Organization (WTO). Well before that investigation began,
numerous Americans believed the United States was less engaged in green-
tech promotion than China. 5 China has come very far in a short amount of
time to promote renewables, and many feel the United States is falling
behind. New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman has been perhaps
the most active proponent of this view, 6 but he has plenty of company (in-
cluding President Obama, as shown by the quote above). In this article, I
will use "greentech" to refer to renewable energy technologies such as solar
and wind power (the subject of many articles), even though some commen-
tators discuss other technologies such as hybrid and electric vehicles.7
China has audacious long-term national targets for renewables that are
orders of magnitude higher than current output. In the past few years, Chi-
na has surpassed short-term milestones, which suggests that it can meet the
high long-term targets. And even these ambitious targets are in the process
of being ratcheted up, if recent reports are to be believed. China could be
generating more electricity from renewables in 2020 than any other nation
on earth. It has also advanced rapidly in private sector spending on renewa-
ble energy technology and research and development spending.
Many observers state that we are doing less than the Chinese to pro-
mote renewables and that we are in a competition with China. After ex-
5. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Failure Is Not an Option, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/opinion/28friedman.html?ref-thomaslfriedman (opening the
column with "China is having a good week in America. Yes it is. I'd even suggest that there is some
high-fiving going on in Beijing. I mean, wouldn't you if you saw America's Democratic and Republi-
can leaders conspiring to ensure that America cedes the next great global industry-E.T., energy tech-
nology-to China?").
6. Friedman has written often in his column about the need for American energy policy to move
forward expeditiously, frequently contrasting America's lack of progress unfavorably with China's
policies. See Christina Larson, America's Unfounded Fears of a Green-Tech Race with China, YALE
ENv'T 360 (Feb. 8, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2238 (stating that "Friedman
has used the bully pulpit of his influential New York Times column to warn that the United States is
engaged in a global green-tech competition with China, whose potential dominance represents a 'new
Sputnik').
Friedman has written numerous columns in the first half of 2010 alone that mention China's
energy ascendancy. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, We're Gonna Be Sorry, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 24, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/opinion/25friedman.html?ref-thomaslfriedman; Thomas L.
Friedman, What 7 Republicans Could Do, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/opinion/21friedman.html?ref-thomaslfriedman (noting that "by
2012, China should pretty much own the clean-tech industry"); Thomas L. Friedman, No Fooling
Mother Nature, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/opinion/05friedman.html?ref-thomaslfriedman; Friedman, supra
note 5; Thomas L. Friedman, Global Weirding Is Here, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/opinion/17friedman.html?ref-thomaslfriedman ("China ... is
investing heavily in clean-tech, efficiency and high-speed rail. It sees the future trends and is betting on
them. Indeed, I suspect China is quietly laughing at us right now.").
7. See, e.g., John Gartner, China to Best US. in EVs, but Not Hybrids, HYBRID CARS (Aug. 17,
2010), http://www.hybridcars.com/news/china-best-us-evs-not-hybrids-28457.html.
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amining our own energy policy, they claim that the Chinese are embarking
on a path that will have disastrous long-term consequences for our nation if
we do not act now. A metaphor in much of this writing is that the two na-
tions are engaged in a new "green energy race." 8 This term deliberately
invokes the "space race" competition between the U.S.S.R. and the United
States to achieve milestones in space after the 1957 launch of the Sputnik
satellite. Some writers have even made an explicit comparison between the
two eras.
The "green energy race" means different things to different people,
but to simplify matters a bit, there are two related but different arguments
being made. The first is that the United States is missing out on the eco-
nomic opportunity available in moving toward a "green economy." In this
view, China is creating more green economic activity and jobs than we are.
Some fear that China will dominate the global market for greentech, ex-
porting it to us and diminishing American companies' ability to compete
with Chinese firms. This, of course, is the bedrock principle of the USTR
investigation, and must be considered in the context of the complex rela-
tionship between the two nations. The United States has departed from its
"courtship" of China, criticizing it for its currency stance and other eco-
nomic policies, 9 and the greentech investigation represents only one area in
which the United States and China have recently tussled with each other.10
To some, "losing" the race and falling behind the Chinese would have
serious consequences for national supremacy. Some writers also suggest
that achieving progress in greentech is a pressing matter of climate securi-
ty, which they compare to concerns in the 1950s about national security.
While this comparison is a bit strained, even senior military leaders recog-
nize that the impacts of climate change could be as drastic as those of los-
ing military supremacy. Commentators concerned about climate security
believe that the very survival of each nation is at stake if it does not act
expeditiously and that the United States is jeopardizing its future by not
taking appropriate steps to address the dire situation presented by climate
change. In this view, failing to transition to a clean energy economy would
8. See infra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
9. Mark Landler & Sewell Chan, Taking Harder Stance Toward China, Obama Lines Up Allies,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/worldlasia/26china.html?_r-1 &partner-rss&emc=rss&src=igw.
10. Sewell Chan & Keith Bradsher, U.S. to Investigate China's Clean Energy Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/16/business/16wind.html. Note this comment from
Rep. Charles Schumer, however: "An investigation into China's illegal subsidies for its clean energy
industry is overdue, but it's no substitute for dealing with China's currency manipulation." Id.
2011] I11
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have a deleterious effect on national wealth and welfare and would leave
the United States vulnerable to ceding its position as a major world power.
In this Article, I will evaluate these two different, but related claims
that we are in a "green energy race" with China. As I describe in Part I, the
space race rhetoric and the affirmative step of starting a trade dispute with
China over greentech, are counterproductive. Playing into fears about Chi-
na has provided a convenient means of political theater in the 2010 election
season,II but portraying China's ascendancy in greentech as a national
threat will have high and unacceptable costs. Given our nations' pressing
needs to address climate change, it would be much more productive to
forego the rhetoric of the greentech war and support both nations' green-
tech initiatives. Moreover, the reasons given for why China is "winning"
the "race" are not yet completely convincing.
Looking past the symbolic rhetoric of the race metaphor yields further
interesting insights about our own approach to energy policy. The central
impact of the Sputnik surprise is that it galvanized the United States into
action. It called immediate attention to how we appeared to lag behind the
U.S.S.R. in our attention to space research and development with federal
space programs that were poorly coordinated and duplicative. In the post-
Sputnik era, we rushed with fervor to develop a stronger space program.
The analogous situation is what the proponents of the "space race" meta-
phor intend for the United States-a crash program of greentech develop-
ment and deployment.
The most useful purpose of comparing 2010 and 1957, then, is to
prompt the United States to reorient its energy policy to include a more
focused effort in greentech, as I propose in Part II. Comparing our current
situation to the pre-Sputnik landscape in the United States allows us to
learn from history and improve our greentech policy. However, invoking a
race metaphor may be less productive than capturing national attention in
the United States with concrete, clear domestic goals. I believe that the
United States should articulate a single, clear national goal in greentech,
just as it did with space research in the Cold War era. A central event in our
national space program development was the 1961 announcement by Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy of our intention to put a man on the Moon by the end
of the 1960s.12 This speech catalyzed a decade-long push in science and
technology that ranks as one of the most focused in the history of the Unit-
ed States.
11. CAGWmedia, Chinese Professor, YoUTUBE (Oct. 20, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-OTSQozWP-rM.
12. See infra notes 249-251 and accompanying text.
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A similar national goal for greentech would unite proponents of re-
newable energy in a targeted way. Elsewhere, I have argued for the crea-
tion of "solar utilities"' 3 that would deliver greentech in the residential
setting by consolidating all of the functions of financing, installing, and
servicing in single entities that would ramp up to utility-size scale in indi-
vidual areas. In Part II, I discuss why this is the sort of idea that could cap-
ture the popular imagination and lead to more greentech development in the
United States than casting China as a competitor will accomplish.
I. GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION IN GREENTECH?: SUITABILITY OF THE
"SPACE RACE" METAPHOR
The idea that the United States and China are locked in a competition
for greentech supremacy has many adherents. A recent Internet search for
"China" and "green energy race" by the author yielded over 300,000 re-
sults, with most of the top 100 having directly relevant titles, such as
"Who's Winning the Clean Energy Race?," 14 "Is China Beating the U.S. in
Green Technology Development?,"1 5 and so forth. As journalist and China
expert Christina Larson observes, "[flew business stories have ever been
imbued with so much gravitas, so many fears, so many metaphors, so much
geopolitical speculation, as the recent articles and coverage of China's
growing green-tech manufacturing sector."16 The "China as green competi-
tor" narrative has captivated journalists, 17 bloggers, 18 politicians,19 envi-
13. Joel B. Eisen, Can Urban Solar Become a "Disruptive" Technology?: The Case for Solar
Utilities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 53 (2010).
14. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, WHO'S WINNING THE CLEAN ENERGY RACE?: GROWTH,
COMPETITION AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE WORLD'S LARGEST ECONOMIES 7 (2010),
www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Global-warming/G-20%20Report.pdf
(containing a section titled "China Takes the Lead, While the U.S. Slips").
15. Is China Beating the US. in Green Technology Development?, BUILDAROO.COM (Mar. 7,
2010), http://buildaroo.com/news/article/china-green-technology-development.
16. Larson, supra note 6.
17. See e.g., Keith Bradsher, On Clean Energy, China Skirts Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/09/business/global09trade.html?pagewanted=l&_r-l&ref-keith br
adsher; Keith Bradsher, China Leading Global Race to Make Clean Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/business/energy-environment/31renew.html; Kent Garber, US.
Lacks a Coherent Clean Energy Strategy: China Is the Main Competitor in the Global Energy Race,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 7, 2010,
http://politics.usnews.com/news/energy/articles/2010/05/07/us-lacks-a-coherent-clean-energy-
strategy.html; Evan Osnos, Letter from China: Green-Tech Space Race, NEW YORKER, Apr. 21, 2009,
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2009/04/greentech-space-race.html; Bruce Usher,
Red China, Green China, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/opinion/07Usher.html (observing that "[b]y giving China more
time to develop its capacity while neglecting our own, America is not just losing the clean-tech race, it's
forfeiting it"); Gerard Wynn, Is Clean Tech China's Moon Shot?, REUTERS, Jan. 28, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60RO2520100128; supra note 6 and accompanying text (Tho-
mas Friedman's New York Times columns).
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ronmentalists, 20 think tanks, 21 executives of venture capital and energy
companies, 22 financial market analysts and commentators, 23 and many
others. Most of this commentary simply takes the fact of the race for
granted, and few are so bold as to state otherwise. 24 The enthusiastic recep-
tion in many quarters to the USTR investigation is yet another measure of
the strength of the race idea.
Taking other nations to task for negative impacts on our energy policy
is nothing new, of course. Since the 1970s, no fewer than eight Presidents
from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama have articulated a goal of achieving
18. Richard Brubaker, Will China Surpass the US as a Superpower?, ALL ROADS LEAD TO CHINA
(Jul. 16, 2010, 6:22), http://www.allroadsleadtochina.com/2010/07/16/wiIl-china-surpass-the-us-as-a-
superpower; Derek Thompson, Is China Winning the Energy Race?, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 17, 2010,
2:25 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/is-china-winning-the-energy-
race/58321, republished by Julian L. Wong, Interview with The Atlantic on China and the Clean Energy
Race, GREEN LEAP FORWARD (Jul. 8, 2010), http://greenleapforward.com/2010/07/08/interview-with-
the-atlantic-on-china-and-the-clean-energy-race.
19. Rep. Ed Markey, Landing a Clean Energy Victory, HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 20, 2009, 9:57
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-ed-markey/landing-a-clean-energy-vi b_240938.html.
20. Frances Beinecke, In the Clean Energy Race, Jobs Can Stay in America, SWITCHBOARD: NAT.
RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (Feb. 23, 2010),
http://switchboard.nrdc.orgfblogs/fbeinecke/in-the-clean-energyrace-with.html (commentary by
Frances Beinecke, President of the Natural Resources Defense Council); Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., The
New Arms Race, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2009, 3:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-
f-kennedy-jr/the-new-arms-race_b_364211 .html.
21. Daniel J. Weiss & Susan Lyon, Running for First in the Clean-Energy Race, CENTER FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/01/sotu-energy.html (the
Center's "Out of the Running" report, as discussed below, analyzes the race in detail); ROB ATKINSON
ET AL.. BREAKTHROUGH INST. & THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., RISING TIGERS SLEEPING
GIANT: ASIAN NATIONS SET TO DOMINATE THE CLEAN ENERGY RACE BY OUT-INVESTING THE UNITED
STATES (2009), available at http://thebreakthrough.org/blogfRising Tigers.pdf; Van Jones & Pan
Jiahua, Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Climate Change, Innovation and the Clean Energy Race, Gov
MONITOR (May 23, 2010), http://www.thegovmonitor.com/world-news/britain/climate-change-
innovation-and-the-clean-energy-race-31528.html.
22. John Doerr & Jeff Immelt, Falling Behind On Green Tech, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/02/AR2009080201563.html (com-
mentary by John Doerr, partner in the venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, and by
Jeff Immelt, chairman and chief executive of General Electric, a major manufacturer of wind turbine
equipment).
23. Eric Pooley, Senate Inaction Cedes U.S. Energy Race to China, BLOOMBERG, Jul. 29, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-30/senate-inaction-cedes-u-s-energy-race-to-china-
commentary-by-eric-pooley.html; Kerri Shannon, China, Europe Lapping the United States in the
Clean Energy Race, MONEY MORNING, Apr. 2, 2010, http://moneymoming.com/2010/04/02/clean-
energy/; Jeff Siegel, Have We Even Entered The Clean Energy Race Yet?, SOLAR FEEDS (Aug. 12,
2010), http://www.solarfeeds.com/green-chip-stocks/13829-have-we-even-entered-the-clean-energy-
race-yet; Nick Hodge, China's Clean Energy Progress: Who's Winning the Cleantech Arms Race?,
GREEN CHIP STOCKS (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.greenchipstocks.com/articles/cleantech-2010-enter-
the-dragon/744.
24. Comments criticizing the "race" metaphor include Charlie McElwee, Greentech Wars, CHINA
ENVTL. L. (Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com (stating that "greentech war and
competition metaphors ... seem quite stale, unreflective, and insincere to me"), and Larson, supra note
6 (stating that "folks in the green-tech and environmental frontlines-as opposed to politicians and
commentators-don't see a 'race' at all").
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"energy independence" by weaning the United States from foreign oil.25
The "race" metaphor is new energy geopolitics, as the differences between
the "green energy race" and "energy independence" are obvious. The ener-
gy resources in this "race"-deployment of solar and wind capacity-are
largely not in place today. Unlike the 1970s, we are not dependent on
another nation's resources, 26 but instead, purportedly locked in a competi-
tion to develop them. Some say the race is already over. One observer
notes, "[t]he United States ceded its leadership in the production of clean
energy technologies during the past decade of neglect." 27
A. What Is the "Race," and Is China "Winning"?
What exactly is the "green energy race"? The more one reads about it,
the more difficult it becomes to assess just what the "race" is about. In the
space race, there were readily identifiable, concrete goals that inhered in
physical space: put satellites and humans in orbit, and land a man on the
moon. Here, it is not so clear. What is the purpose of a competition with
China? Is it to have more solar panels and wind turbines in place? More
governmental and private investment in greentech? More greentech-
friendly governmental policies? All of the above? Those writing about it
often have different agendas. Companies want more investment in green-
tech and more access to China's markets. Environmentalists want more
active federal policies to encourage deployment of renewables. Free traders
want barriers to trade removed.
25. Richard L. Pierce, Jr., Energy Independence and Global Warming, 37 ENVTL. L. 595, 596
(2007). For a more humorous (or sobering, depending on one's perspective) take on the persistence of
"energy independence" throughout numerous presidencies, see The Daily Show with Jon Stewart,
(Comedy Central television broadcast Jun. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-june-1 6-2010/an-energy-independent-future. Today, we
depend even more on fossil fuels for transportation than we did in the 1970s. Pierce, supra. Some
believe it is even counterproductive to stress "energy independence" while attempting to address cli-
mate change. Id. at 596-97; see also Paul Roberts, The Seven Myths of Energy Independence: Why
Forging a Sustainable Energy Future is Dependent on Foreign Oil, MOTHER JONES (May-June 2008),
http://motherjones.com/politics/2008/05/seven-myths-energy-independence.
26. Some say China is attempting to comer the market for rare earth elements that are components
of renewable energy products. See, e.g., Geoffrey Styles, China's Leverage on Renewable Energy
Increases, ENERGY COLLECTIVE (Aug. 17, 2010), http://theenergycollective.com/geoffrey-
styles/41784/chinas-leverage-renewable-energy-increases; Bradsher, On Clean Energy, China Skirts
Rules, supra note 17. However, no one is claiming that we are dependent on China today for these
metals or any other greentech. This did not stop a prominent writer from speculating in the New York
Times that some day this might be the case. Bradsher, China Leading Global Race to Make Clean
Energy, supra note 17.
27. Daniel J. Weiss, Susan Lyon & Tina Ramos, The Stone Soup Clean Energy and Climate Bill,
CLIMATE PROGRESS (Jul. 16, 2010), http://climateprogress.org/2010/07/16/the-stone-soup-clean-
energy-and-climate-bill.
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Consider a threshold question: Why are we competing with China?
Other nations have a longer head start. European nations like Denmark and
Germany28 have had greentech policies in place for many years, have seen
strong growth in their greentech industries, and have generated much of
their electricity from renewables. 29 A European Union directive sets bind-
ing targets for member nations to generate 20% of their electricity from
renewables by 2020.30 Many European companies already sell greentech
equipment in the United States, 31 so it would make just as much sense to
say Danish and German companies threaten the growth of the American
renewable energy industry as to say that Chinese firms do. Some observers
note that the race is not with one nation but many, 32 yet the prevailing
comparison is to China.
There is something much more to the "race" metaphor, then, than
growth in greentech. As in the space race, there is the pervasive sense that
28. See Preben Maegaard, Danish Renewable Energy Policy, WORLD COUNCIL FOR RENEWABLE
ENERGY, www.were.de/en/images/stories/pdflWCREMaegaadDanish%20RE%2OPolicy.pdf (last
visited Oct. 6, 2010) (Denmark); Renewable Energy Policy in Germany: An Overview and Assessment,
JOINT GLOBAL CHANGE RES. INST., http://www.globalchange.umd.edu/energytrends/germany/6/ (last
visited Oct. 6, 2010) (Germany).
29. By some measures (for example, amount of solar power generated), Spain is winning the
greentech race, just as it won the soccer World Cup. Talk about dominance! Jasmine Green, Spain:
Leading the Renewable Energy Race, CARE2, http://www.care2.com/causes/environment/blog/spain-
number-one-in-solar-power-and-more/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2010). One could also point to Portugal,
which will get an astounding 45% of its electricity from renewables in 2010. Elisabeth Rosenthal,
Portugal Gives Itself a Clean-Energy Makeover, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/10/science/earth/lOportugal.htmi.
30. Council Directive 2001/77, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September
2001 on the Promotion of Electricity Produced from Renewable Energy Sources in the Internal Electric-
ity Market, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 283) 35 (EC); see Council Directive 2009/28, of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable
Sources and Amending and Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, 2009 O.J.
(L 140) 17 (EC) (implementing the targets); Legal Framework for Wind Energy: Key Aspects of the
Renewable Energy Directive, EUR. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, http://www.ewea.org/index.php?id=197 (last
visited Oct. 6, 2010) (explaining both documents); Renewable Energy: What Do We Want to Achieve?,
EUR. COMMISSION ENERGY, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/index-en.htm (last updated Feb. 7,
2010) (discussing the targets and other policies).
31. See AWEA MID-YEAR 2010 MARKET REPORT: JULY 2010, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N (2010),
http://www.awea.org/publications/reports/2Ql0.pdf (listing current and proposed installations in the
United States, with names of turbine manufacturers, including European manufacturers such as Vestas);
Global Market Outlook for Photovoltaics Until 2014: May 2010 Update, EUR. PHOTOVOLTAIC
INDUSTRY Ass'N (May 15, 2010),
http://www.epia.org/fileadmin/EPIA-docs/public/GlobalMarketOutlook-forPhotovoltaics-until_20
14.pdf (listing activities of European solar manufacturers).
32. A recent report by the Center for American Progress compares United States' renewable
energy policies unfavorably to both European nations and China. KATE GORDON, JULIAN L. WONG &
JT MCLAIN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, OUT OF THE RUNNING? How GERMANY, SPAIN, AND CHINA
ARE SEIZING THE ENERGY OPPORTUNITY AND WHY THE UNITED STATES RISKS GETTING LEFT BEHIND
(2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/pdfloutofrunning.pdf. See also
Markey, supra note 19 (Rep. Markey's comment that "Russia was our singular competitor in the celes-
tial contest. In this terrestrial endeavor, we have many.").
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if China has more extensive greentech investments and deployment than
we do, there will be drastic consequences for national power and wealth.
Denmark and Germany attract less attention than China because they pose
less of a threat to the United States' overall position in the world. This sug-
gests that the race metaphor is a convenient device for those anxious to
feed on Americans' doubts about the loss of superpower status. 33
Looking behind the rhetoric and evaluating the "race" claims on their
merits, it is hardly even clear that the United States is "losing" to China.
The differences between the two nations in greentech are much more subtle
than they appear in the prevailing narrative. 34 This section will focus on
three ways in which commentators claim we are falling behind. One is the
growth of China's greentech industry at the possible expense of American
firms. Another is the level of national government support for renewables,
which some see as more robust and committed in China than in the United
States. Finally, some point to rapid growth in installed capacity to suggest
that the Chinese are surging ahead. I find each of these claims to be over-
stated at present or to require some telling context that is often left out of
the narrative.
1. Growth of China's Greentech Industry
One fear animating many is that multinational companies will find it
difficult to sell their greentech in China, and Chinese companies will flood
the United States with their products. It is not difficult to see how this fear
has gained traction, as it reflects broader American unease about China's
potential for global economic dominance.
In 1979, China began to experiment with the free market, and since
then, it has experienced robust growth. 35 Although China's economy is
33. Christina Larson puts it as follows:
It is telling what is left out of the increasingly dominant "U.S. versus China" green-tech
"race" narrative. For starters, there are a lot of other countries at work developing green-tech
and becoming significant green-tech markets-the low-carbon future, after all, isn't solely a
G-2 aspiration. Yet because the politics are different (there's not the anxiety of the reigning
superpower nervously eyeing the new kid on the block), the green aspirations of any country
not named China are viewed through an entirely different prism by U.S. commentators. Ger-
many, for instance, is home to the world's top two solar manufacturing companies. Yet we
don't read headlines about Old Europe "cleaning our clock" to the 21st century.
Larson, supra note 6.
34. Id. (statement of Elizabeth Economy, director of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations, that "[e]ven when you are looking at these big numbers that are coming out of China today, I
think it really pays to give a close look at what is actually happening on the ground [and t]hen you
begin to get a different, more nuanced picture than what is blasted on the business section of the New
York Times").
35. CONSTANTIN CRACHILOv, RANDALL S. HANCOCK & GARY SHARKEY, CHINA GREENTECH
INITIATIVE, THE CHINA GREENTECH REPORT 2009 21 (2009), available at http://www.china-
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developing more slowly in 2010 than in recent years, it is still growing at
an annual rate of 8%,36 considerably stronger than the United States' econ-
omy. 37 In 2010, some reports noted that China's economy had become the
world's second largest, surpassing Japan's. 38 China's "pace of industriali-
zation is significantly faster than that experienced by other countries
throughout history." 39 So much of China's manufacturing output is already
sold in the United States that observers believe we are "joined at the hip
economically." 40 Commentators marvel at China's burgeoning infrastruc-
ture and other indicia of modernization, 41 although some acknowledge that
environmental and other costs may jeopardize continued strong growth. 42
greentech.com/sites/default/files/CGTR2009-FullReport.pdf (citing similar data from the United States
Department of Agriculture's International Macroeconomics Data Set for 1978-2008 and noting that
China's economy has doubled roughly every seven to eight years); WAYNE M. MORRISON, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, DEFENSE & TRADE Div., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 1B98014, CHINA'S ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS (2006), available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/DB98014.pdf (detailing the government's
shift in policy and stating that "[fjrom 1979 to 2005 China's real GDP grew at an average annual rate of
9.6%"); Data: GDP Growth (Annual Percentage), WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (last visited Oct. 6, 2010) (data for 2005-
2008).
36. China Sets 8% Target for 2010 Economic Growth, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/05/content_9541616.htm (last updated Mar. 5, 2010).
37. Hibah Yousuf, US. Recovery Sputters, CNNMONEY.COM, July 30, 2010,
http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/30/news/economy/gdp/index.htm (stating that the United States expe-
rienced a 2.4% annual rate of growth in 3Q 2010); Motoko Rich, US. Economy Slowed to 1.6% Pace in
2nd Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/28/business/economy/28econ.html (figure revised in August 2010
downward to 1.6%).
38. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 21 (citing data from the International Mone-
tary Fund and stating that most analysts predict that China will overtake Japan); David Barboza, China
Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html. By some predictions, China may
overtake the United States by 2030. See, e.g., CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 32
fig. 15.
39. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 21.
40. U.S. and China Vie for Clean Energy Leadership, ENERGY CHINA FORUM (Aug. 17, 2010),
http://www.energychinaforum.com/news/39260.shtml.
41. See, e.g., Carlo Rotella, The Growth of a Thoughtful City: After a Visit to the Fast-Paced
Construction in China, Boston Feels Like Heaven, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 16, 2010,
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorialopinion/oped/articles/2010/08/16/thegrowth_of athou
ghtful city/ ("Even second- and third-tier provincial cities like Huangshi and Luan - the Worcesters
and Springfields of China - boast brand-new airports that put dowdy, dingy Logan to shame; massive-
ly transformative highway projects that make the Big Dig look like overpriced cosmetic surgery; bullet
train service that makes Amtrak's Acela look like a musket ball fired underwater; and forests of new
high-rises, going up 20 and 30 at a time. . . .").
A thoughtful essay on the rapid growth of one Chinese city is Christina Larson, Chicago on
the Yangtze: Welcome to Chongqing, the Biggest City You've Never Heard Of FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept.-
Oct. 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/16/chicagoon-the yangtze.
42. See, e.g., CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 25-30 (discussing environmental
degradation in depth); Elizabeth C. Economy, Congressional Testimony: China's Environmental Chal-
lenges, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Sept. 22 2004,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7391/congressionaltestimony.html; Impact of Growth on China: What
have Been Some of the Negative Consequences of China's Rapid Growth?, UCLA ASIAN AM. STUDIES
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Others note that we do not have full clarity because data on China's growth
rely on questionable official sources. 43 Yet even those taking a hard look at
the official party line believe that China's economic ascendancy is "world-
changing." 44
Many believe that domestic products cannot compete against those
manufactured in China due to China's advantages in less expensive labor,
more lax protections of intellectual property, fixed currency rates (until
very recently), and weaker environmental protections. 45 Is greentech simp-
ly destined to be another area in which the Chinese competitive advantage
will overpower American firms? In the depths of a recession in the United
States, descriptions of growing Chinese greentech firms invoke strong im-
ages of a rising Asian industrial juggernaut.
China's 2007 "Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Re-
newable Energy in China" contained an explicit goal to develop a competi-
tive domestic renewables sector, 46 and the nation's greentech sector is
growing rapidly. China's domestic wind turbine industry rose from virtual
nonexistence to become a major player in the global market in less than
five years. In 2009, three of the largest wind turbine manufacturers in the
world were Chinese, even though the two largest were Danish (Vestas) and
CTR., http://www.aasc.ucla.eduluschina/econ whobenefits.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2010); and many
other sources discuss the negative impacts of growth in China.
A recent analysis is JONATHAN WATTS, WHEN A BILLION CHINESE PEOPLE JUMP: How CHINA
WILL SAVE MANKIND - OR DESTROY IT (2010), as noted by Anthony Tao, Will China Save or Destroy
Humanity? Jonathan Watts Launches His New Book on the Environment, BEIJINGER BLOG (July 14,
2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.thebeijinger.com/blog/2010/07/14/Will-China-Save-or-Destroy-
Humanity-Jonathan-Watts-Launches-His-New-Book-on-the-Envi. See also Jonathan Watts, China's
Mega-Jams Show the True Cost of Coal: The Number of Coal Trucks Suggest Strains on China's
Energy Supply that Are Equal to Those on its Transport System, GUARDIAN ENV'T BLOG (Aug. 25,
2010, 2:22 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2010/aug/25/china-mega-jams-coal
(reporting that major traffic jams result from the large number of coal-bearing trucks on China's roads).
43. Gady Epstein, This Just In: China Economy Doing Better Than Japan, FORBES BLOGS (Aug.
16, 2010, 1:47 AM), http://blogs.forbes.com/gadyepstein/2010/08/16/this-just-in-china-economy-doing-
better-than-japan/.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Stan Abrams, This is Your Brain on Nationalism: US-China Trade Deficit Follies,
CHINA/DIVIDE (Apr. 14, 2010), http://chinadivide.com/2010/your-brain-on-nationalism-us-china-trade-
deficit-follies.html (summarizing a number of claims and reports). With respect to greentech specifical-
ly, see Bradsher, China Leading Global Race to Make Clean Energy, supra note 17, citing low labor
costs as a Chinese advantage.
46. Nat'l Dev. & Reform Comm'n, Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable
Energy in China, CHINA DEV. GATEWAY (Sept. 4, 2007), http://en.chinagate.cn/reports/2007-
09/13/content 8872839.htm ("By 2020, a relatively complete renewable energy technology and indus-
try system will have been established, so that a domestic manufacturing capability based mainly on
China's own IPRs will have been established, satisfying the needs for deploying renewable energy on a
large scale in China.").
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American (GE Wind). 47 China leads the world market for solar PV cells
and modules, producing more than 40%.48 Chinese firms' share of the do-
mestic greentech market has increased rapidly, 49 and Chinese companies
have become major players around the globe.50 Evidence of Chinese com-
panies' global ambition is not hard to find. At the 2010 soccer World Cup,
advertising for the Chinese firm Yingli Solar was prominently featured on
the sideline dasher boards,51 and Yingli's CEO attributed an upswing in the
firm's orders after the tournament to its successful sponsorship. 52
Still, many Chinese products are sold in China. The USTR investiga-
tion's petition details a growing imbalance in "environmental goods" be-
tween the United States and China, 53 but in some categories of renewable
energy equipment, Chinese firms have been less successful in the United
States. Chinese firms sold only 28 MW worth of wind turbines outside of
China in 2009.54 In 2009, Goldwind provided wind turbines to a project in
47. RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, RENEWABLES 2010:
GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 30 (2010) [hereinafter RENEWABLES], available at http://www.unep.org/sefi-
ren2 1/.
48. Compare Global Market Outlook for Photovoltaics Until 2014: May 2010 Update, supra note
31, at 22, with U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY,
2008 SOLAR TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT 15 (2010), available at
http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/solar/pdfs/46025.pdf (stating that the 2008 market share of Chinese firms
was 27%).
49. Global Intelligence Alliance, China to Lead Global Wind Energy Development?, RENEWABLE
ENERGY FOCUS (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com/view/7283/china-to-lead-
global-wind-energy-development/?opattr-China toleadglobal windenergydevelopment%3F.
50. JIM HIGHT, BUILDING BRIDGES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: A ROADMAP OF GLOBAL
TRADE PATTERNS IN WIND POWER GOODS AND SERVICEs, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON TRADE: TRADE
AND CLIMATE CHANGE 6 (2009), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/63/42886096.pdf ("[I]n 2004,
China had only one domestic WTG manufacturer-Goldwind. By the end of 2008, there were approx-
imately 60, with Goldwind as the leading seller, followed by Sinovel, Dongfang and Windey."); Eric
Martinot & Li Junfeng, Renewable Energy Policy Update for China, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD
(July 21, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2010/07/renewable-energy-
policy-update-for-china.
51. Stuart Elliott, An Underdog Amid the Giants Lining the World Cup's Fields, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/business/media/07adco.html; The Challenge of China's
Green Technology Policy, CLIMATE PROGRESS (July 15, 2010 9:33 AM),
http://climateprogress.org/2010/07/15/the-challenge-of-chinaE2%80%99s-green-technology-policy/
(statement of Julian Wong, Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress Action Fund).
52. Tom Cheyney, Yingli Green Posts Strong Q2 Results, Guides 16W of Solar PV Module Ship-
ments for 2010, PV-TECH, Aug. 19, 2010, http://www.pv-
tech.org/news/_a/yingli greenposts strong q2_resultsguides_ gw of solarpv module shipment/.
53. Pet. for Relief Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended: China's Policies
Affecting Trade and Investment in Green Technology, 13, Sept. 9, 2010.
54. Chinese Wind Turbine Manufacturers' Global Expansion: The Dream and The Reality,
GERSON LEHRMAN GROUP (May 9, 2010), http://www.glgroup.com/News/Chinese-Wind-Turbine-
Manufacturers-Global-Expansion--The-Dream-and-The-Reality-48260.html; see also E-mail from
Alexander U. Conrad to author (Sept. 7, 2010) (on file with author) (noting that Chinese firms have not
penetrated the Brazilian wind market, despite that government's promotion of wind energy and a favor-
able climate between the two nations).
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Minnesota, 55 and a year later, Yingli Solar supplied solar panels to Rutgers
University. 56 Some predict an upswing in Chinese greentech exports to the
United States, 57 and at least one high-profile proposed project in the United
States involving Chinese technology has attracted specific negative atten-
tion. In 2009, a proposed U.S.-China joint wind farm venture in Texas gen-
erated a firestorm of protest from members of Congress who claimed the
Chinese companies supplying technology to the project were being sup-
ported with American stimulus funds. 58
Another factor fostering apprehension in the United States (and cited
in the USTR investigation) is that some feel the Chinese government ap-
pears to be shutting foreign manufacturers out of its large domestic mar-
ket. 59 Official China government policy promotes "indigenous innovation,"
calling for the nation's reliance on foreign technology to decrease to 30%
or less.60 Foreign observers have reported that as this strategy has been
implemented in greentech, it has become more difficult for foreign compa-
55. RENEWABLES, supra note 47, at 30; Xinjiang Goldwind Sci. and Tech. Co. Ltd., Goldwind
Debut at Wind Power 2010 to Herald Global Expansion, PR NEWSWIRE, May 23, 2010,
http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/goldwind-debut-at-wind-power-2010-to-herald-global-
expansion-94711839.html.
56. Rutgers' Chinese Solar Panels Show Clean-Energy Shift, NJ.coM, July 24, 2010,
http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssfl2010/07/rutgers-chinesesolar-Panels s.html; Brian Rezny,
Chinese Energy Cleans Up Its Act, SEEKING ALPHA (July 27, 2010),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/216784-chinese-energy-cleans-up-its-act.
57. Solar Market Experiences Shakeout, China Is Well Positioned to Dominate World Market,
TOMMY Toy's BLOG (Mar. 10, 2010, 7:36 AM), http://tommytoy.vox.com/library/post/solar-market-
experiences-shakeout-china-is-well-positioned-to-dominate-world-market.html.
58. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer, Casey, Brown & Tester Urge
Obama Administration to Suspend Stimulus Program Funneling Billions Overseas (Mar. 3, 2010),
http://schumer.senate.gov/record.cfm?id-322732& (detailing efforts by four Senators to block federal
funding for the project); see also Yael Borofsky & Jesse Jenkins, The Real Policy Lesson From the
Chinese Wind Turbine "Scare," BREAKTHROUGH INST. BLOG (Nov. 9, 2009, 1:47 PM),
http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/2009/11/the real policylesson-from-th.shtml (claiming that "Senator
Schumer and others who seek to bar Chinese manufacturers from stimulus funds are missing the point"
and should focus instead in promoting American greentech firms).
59. See, e.g., Wynn, supra note 17 (stating that "Western businesses are worried China is freezing
them out of this lucrative market, preferring to nurture its own nascent industries without subjecting
them to competition"); Keith Johnson, Protectionist Breezes: Wind-Power Companies Cry Foul on
China, WALL ST. J. Blogs (May 28, 2009, 12:02 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2009/05/28/protectionist-breezes-wind-power-companies-
cry-foul-on-chinal.
60. See JAMEs MCGREGOR, CHINA'S DRIVE FOR "INDIGENOUS INNOVATION": A WEB OF
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES 1, 15 (2009), available at
www.apcoworldwide.com/content/PDFs/ChinasDrive for Indigenous-Innovation.pdf (providing a
comprehensive discussion of these policies); Julian L. Wong, How to Deal with Chinese Green Protec-
tionism: A US. Perspective, GREEN LEAP FORWARD (July 30, 2010),
http://greenleapforward.com/2010/07/30/how-to-deal-with-chinese-green-protectionism-a-us-
perspective/ (discussing the Medium-to-Long Term National Plan for Science and Technology Devel-
opment and the National Indigenous Innovation Accreditation Program in the greentech context).
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nies to get their technology accepted in domestic Chinese projects. 61 A
recent report on innovation states that as many as thirty-six separate gov-
ernment regulations promote domestic greentech and hamper foreign firms'
ability to compete in China.62 Even before the USTR investigation, one
observer stated that protectionist claims against China were reaching a
"fever pitch."63 The USTR investigation petition cites regulations promot-
ing domestic companies as unfair trade subsidies, 64 and claims (for exam-
ple) that the indigenous innovation policy gives Chinese firms a 5-10%
advantage in wind turbine procurement processes. 65 Encouraging an-
nouncements of joint ventures and other developments seem to contradict
this emerging protectionist trend.66 China has dropped a requirement that
70% of the components in wind turbines come from domestic sources. 67
Agreements between American companies such as First Solar 68 and Chi-
nese local governments to develop renewable energy projects point to a
potentially large market for American greentech in China.69 Perhaps ironi-
cally, however, the USTR investigation complaint cites the First Solar me-
morandum of understanding to develop a 2 GW solar project as an
impermissible practice under the WTO because First Solar agreed to work
to support China's domestic industries. 70 In August 2010, there were re-
ports that the First Solar agreement might devolve from an exclusive ar-
rangement into a competition with domestic firms for the right to supply
61. See, e.g., Andrew Peaple, For Foreigners, China's Solar Market Is Cloudy, WALL ST. J., Aug.
18, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704554104575434991356731852.html; Joe
McDonald, U.S., Europe Look to China for Clean Energy Sales, CHINA MINING (May 16, 2010),
http://www.chinamining.orgfNews/2010-05-17/1274063691 d3621 1.html.
62. MCGREGOR, supra note 60, at 33.
63. Wong, supra note 60. Another recent article claims that the Chinese government's support for
greentech may violate World Trade Organization rules on government support of firms manufacturing
for the export market. See Bradsher, On Clean Energy, China Skirts Rules, supra note 17.
64. Pet. for Relief Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended, 89-99.
65. Id. at 96.
66. See, e.g., Michael Kanellos, Innovalight Signs with Yingli for Second Chinese Solar Deal,
GREENTECH SOLAR (July 26, 2010), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/readlinnovalight-signs-
with-yingli-for-second-chinese-solar-deall (detailing cooperation between Sunnyvale, California-based
Innovalight, and Yingli Solar).
67. Chen Limin & Wan Zhihong, China's Wind Energy Industry Sees Challenges, CHINA DAILY,
Feb. 22, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-02/22/content_9481836.htm.
68. First Solar and Ordos Take Key Step Forward in 2GW China Project: Cooperation Frame-
work Agreement Signed During China-US Presidential Summit, FIRST SOLAR (Nov. 17, 2009),
http://investor.firstsolar.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=201491&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1356152&highlight=.
69. Julian L. Wong, Center for Am. Progress Action Fund, The Challenge of China's Green
Technology Policy and Ohio's Response: Written Testimony Before the US.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission 9 (July 14, 2010),
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2010hearings/writtentestimonies/10_07_14wrt/1007_14_wongstate
ment.pdf (discussing "success stories of American companies such as First Solar, eSolar, and American
Superconductor making headway into the Chinese market").
70. Pet. for Relief Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended, 94-95.
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equipment to the mammoth project.7 ' As of fall 2010, First Solar's status in
the Ordos endeavor, and the competitive landscape for American firms as a
whole, was uncertain.
The prevailing concern seems to be that Chinese firms will dominate
the global greentech market if current growth rates continue. However, it is
by no means clear that they will. Some signs in the past year point to over-
building and overcapacity in the wind industry, and a possible retrenchment
and consolidation of existing firms. In mid-2010, concern about the failure
of nations to agree on a climate change agreement and projections of slow-
ing demand in China for wind energy made for an uncertain business cli-
mate for wind energy companies. 72 One China-based research analyst
wrote, "[i]t's a tough situation to be a wind turbine manufacturer anywhere
in the world right now, including in China." 73 On the other hand, there
were reports that the top three IPOs in 2010 in global greentech were by
Chinese companies. 74 Other firms moved forward with their offerings, 75
but a planned initial public offering for one firm had to be scrapped in mid-
2010 due to unfavorable market conditions. 76
There is also evidence that Chinese firms are not yet competitive in
certain market segments. Some provincial utilities in China have chosen
Western wind turbines over products from domestic firms due to superior
control systems and longer experience with manufacturing larger turbine
sizes. 77 The quality of some Chinese greentech is often not yet as strong as
that of foreign products.78 As recently as 2009, Chinese wind turbines were
71. Keith B. Richburg, Solar Plan in China's Inner Mongolia Highlights Pitfalls for US. Firms,
WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/12/AR2010081203201 html.
72. Stuart Biggs, Turbine Makers Face 'Tough' Market as Goldwind Slumps (Update2),
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 21, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-2 1/turbine-
makers-face-tough-market-as-goldwind-slumps-update2-.html; Zhang Qi, Sun is Setting on China's
Solar Industry, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 19, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-
01/19/content_7408525.htm (predicting a shakeout in the Chinese solar PV sector).
73. Biggs, supra note 72. See also Limin & Zhihong, supra note 67 (noting that "[r]adical expan-
sion has brought another problem: makers of both turbines and parts have seen their profits slump in
recent years").
74. Dallas Kachan, China Has Already Surpassed the U.S. in Cleantech, SEEKING ALPHA (Aug.
15, 2010), http://seekingalpha.com/article/220547-china-has-already-surpassed-the-u-s-in-cleantech.
75. China's Renewable Energy Giants Look to IPO, NEW NET (Aug. 18, 2010),
http://www.newenergyworldnetwork.com/renewable-energy-news/by technology/solar-bytechnology-
new-news/chinaE2%80%99s-renewable-energy-giants-look-to-ipo.html.
76. Biggs, supra note 72.
77. Thomas Hout, China's Renewable-Energy Clout, FORBES (July 30, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/30/china-solar-wind-industry-markets-equities-clean-technology-
companies_3.html.
78. See generally Javier Campello & Stephen Foster, Global Photovoltaic Industry Analysis with
Focus on the Chinese Market (May 14, 2008) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Millarddlen University,
2011]1 23
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
less capable than their foreign counterparts, 79 as measured by lower capaci-
ty factors (the percentage of time that the turbines operate to generate elec-
tricity).*so
One article on the wind industry observes, "Western producers lead in
the high performance segments, while the Chinese lead in lower-
performance, price-driven segments." 81 Chinese firms have grown quickly
in manufacturing high-volume products but often do not hold key technol-
ogy patents that would enable them to develop more sophisticated equip-
ment. 82 Chinese firms have grown rapidly through acquiring manufacturing
equipment and capitalizing on advantages such as their lower cost of la-
bor.83 As a result, they have quickly ascended into a leadership position in
"downstream" areas of the PV production chain, including cell production
and module assembling, but lag behind in "upstream" areas requiring more
technological skill, such as silicon purification, ingot, and wafer manufac-
turing.84 Chinese companies have a rapidly increasing number of patents,
but to date, the companies are "relatively weak" in terms of the patents they
hold on more sophisticated technology.85 A Chinese observer notes that
"[i]n quantity, China has become a great solar energy patent country[, b]ut
Vdsterds, Sweden), available at www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:127961/FULLTEXT01 (discuss-
ing challenges facing the Chinese PV manufacturing industry).
79. David Cyranoski, Renewable Energy: Beying 's Windy Bet, 457 NATURE 372, 372 (2009),
available at http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090121/pdf/457372a.pdf ("Wind-turbine manufacturers
and wind-farm developers everywhere have faced teething problems, but China has perhaps faced more
difficulties than most. Its wind farms are much less efficient than those in other leading countries [and]
manufacturing defects have plagued Chinese equipment .... ).
80. Hout, supra note 77 (calling the quality of Chinese turbines "questionable"); Richard Lim,
Julisa Mandeville, Ryan Petersen, Jon Saxon, Benjamin Vannier & Tom Wuellner, Winds of Change:
How China's Government Supports Domestic Wind Energy Providers, KELLOGG SCH4. OF MGMT,
NORTHWESTERN U. (Oct. 1, 2009),
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.eduldepartments/intemationallintemationalfocus/article/winds of cha
nge.aspx ("Chinese-made turbines cost up to 20% less than those of multinational manufacturers.
However, field data suggests that Chinese turbines significantly lag foreign products in quality, to the
extent that the long-term revenue sacrificed from lower quality (as measured by turbine capacity factor)
outweighs the upfront cost savings.").
81. Hout, supra note 77.
82. Id.
83. Bradsher, On Clean Energy, China Skirts Rules, supra note 17; see generally Arnaud de la
Tour, Matthieu Glachant & Yann Mdnibre, Innovation and International Technology Transfer: The
Case of the Chinese Photovoltaic Industry (MINES ParisTech, Cema Working Paper Series, Working
Paper 2010-12), available at http://hal-ensmp.archives-
ouvertes.fr/docs/00/49/85/78/PDF/CERNAWP 2010-12.pdf.
84. de la Tour, Glachant & Mnibre, supra note 83; Global Market Outlook for Photovoltaics
Until 2014: May 2010 Update, supra note 31, at 22 & fig.23 (demonstrating that China leads in produc-
tion of cells and modules but trails in other areas).
85. Liu Songbai, China's Solar PV Industry Accelerating Quality Transformation, CHINA ECON.
NET (Aug. 20, 2010), http://en.ce.cnfinsight/201008/20/t20100820_21741172.shtml.
24 [Vol 86:1
THE NEW ENERGY GEOPOLITICS?
... patent power does not mean technical power." 86 In 2009, American
companies held the top ten cited patents worldwide in solar technology.87
Government research and development support is aimed at closing this
technology gap.88 However, funding from the central government may be
inefficient because it focuses too little on basic research. 89 Still, many who
are familiar with China believe that it is only a matter of time before Chi-
nese greentech improves through the well-known Chinese propensity to
grow domestic companies by innovating, based at first on importing for-
eign technology and assimilating it. As energy policy analyst Julian Wong
observes:
One of the historical features of China's technology innovation is the
role of foreign technology in the innovation chain. To achieve its goals
of indigenous innovation, China's government has adopted a model of
"import-absorb-digest-re-innovate." Thus, the early stages of all technol-
ogy development include heavy reliance on foreign technologies. 90
Over time, much as Japanese and Korean automakers have evolved
over the past few decades, Chinese greentech firms may eventually close
the gap and sell more sophisticated products. Even if Chinese solar and
wind technology improves, however, the greentech industry in the United
States is hardly standing still. Unlike a moribund Rust Belt industry ripe for
trampling by foreign companies, it is growing and providing more products
to the domestic and global markets. 91 The cost advantages of Chinese firms
may eventually fade,92 or the gap may close. Chinese workers increasingly
are demanding higher wages and better working conditions. 93 Foreign
firms are increasingly taking another strategy to cut costs: building their
own manufacturing plants in China.94 Some greentech, like the larger com-
86. Id
87. Id
88. See, e.g., de la Tour, Glachant & M6nibre, supra note 83, at 16.
89. Wong, supra note 69, at 7.
90. Id.
91. As but one example of this growth, see Herman K. Trabish, The Birth of a U.S. Wind Power
Manufacturing Industry, WIRED (Aug. 15, 2010), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/08/wind-
power-industry/#ixzz0x5attOL6 (noting that "five U.S. turbine manufacturers in operation in 2005 grew
to 15 in 2009").
92. Bradsher, On Clean Energy, China Skirts Rules, supra note 17 ("Because China's clean
energy industry has relied so heavily on land deals and cheap state-supported loans, the industry could
be vulnerable if China's real estate bubble bursts, or if the banks' loose lending creates financial prob-
lems of the sort that have plagued Western financial markets in recent years.").
93. See, e.g., Richard Brubaker, Chinese Employees are Going for More Frequent Walks, ALL
ROADs LEAD TO CHINA (July 19, 2010), http://www.allroadsleadtochina.com/2010/07/19/employees-
are-going-for-a-walk-more-frequently/; Shaun Rein, Three Big Trends Changing China for Multina-
tionals, FORBES (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/24/china-multinationals-branding-
leadership-careers-rein.html.
94. Hout, supra note 77.
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ponents of wind turbines, is heavy and expensive to transport.95 In the
American market, the costs of shipping large turbines from China might
outweigh higher domestic labor costs. And American greentech firms enjoy
other cost advantages, such as preferential tax policies. 96
On the whole, then, Chinese firms are not yet invincible juggernauts
displacing their foreign counterparts. To assert that as a fact is simply erro-
neous. Further, while predictions of dominance may or may not be accu-
rate, the real question may be whether it matters. Americans may perceive,
rightly or wrongly, that Chinese firms are about to dominate this sector.
There is obvious concern at the highest levels of the United States govern-
ment, as the USTR investigation and high-level discussions and trade mis-
sions involving the American and Chinese governments suggest.97 Some
retort that fear of Chinese firms is as overblown as rhetoric in the 1980s
claiming that mighty Japan was about to dominate the world economic
scene.98 Who is correct? The picture is muddled and leaves room for argu-
ments based on fear of what the Chinese firms might do.
Setting up China as an economic bogeyman has a potential drawback:
it could imperil the bumpy economic relationship between the two nations.
If American companies' biggest fear is being shut out of the Chinese green-
tech market, portraying Chinese companies as participants in a competition
can easily lead to an arms race where each nation erects protectionist bar-
riers to the other's firms. In this zero sum game, there may be one winner,
95. Id. (noting a "bias in favor of local sourcing" because "shipping wind power apparatus is
heavy and awkward"); Trabish, supra note 91; Chinese Wind Turbine Manufacturers' Global Expan-
sion: The Dream and The Reality, supra note 54.
96. Wong, supra note 69, at 8; Bradsher, On Clean Energy, China Skirts Rules, supra note 17
("Many state and local governments in the United States have also built roads, installed power lines and
made other infrastructure improvements that have increased the value of private land as part of pro-
grams to attract clean energy. Tax holidays for such businesses are common in the United States, as in
China.").
97. US Cleantech Trade Mission Heads to China to Boost US Exports, ENERGY CHINA FORUM
(May 18, 2010), http://www.energychinaforum.com/news/35466.shtml.
98. Dan Harris, Why China Won't Rule Tech., CHINA LAW BLOG (July 15, 2010),
http://www.chinalawblog.comi/2010/07/whychinawontrule tech.html (stating that "[the] arguments
are no different than the arguments that were being made about Russia in the 1960s and about Japan in
the 1980s and neither country is really anywhere these days on the technology map"). See also Epstein,
supra note 43 (observing that "we should remember Japan's seeming invincibility in the 1980's and the
stunning two decades of stagnation that followed when we look at China now").
It would hardly be surprising if objections to Chinese involvement in the United States looked
remarkably similar to those of the 1980s regarding Japanese investment. One recent report claims
nothing in the review of U.S. reactions to the boom in Japanese FDI suggests that the expe-
rience will not be repeated in the case of another formidable East Asian nation, particularly
one that does not share many of the strategic, political and military common interests with the
U.S. that muted and cabined the investment friction vis-A-vis Japan.
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Is the U.S. Ready for FDI from China? Lessons from Japan's Experience in the
1980s, in INVESTING IN THE UNITED STATES: IS THE US READY FOR FDI FROM CHINA? (Karl P. Sau-
vant ed., 2008), available at www.vcc.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/MilhauptFinalEnglish.pdf.
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or none at all. Some have argued that for this reason alone, it would be best
to drop the rhetoric about a green energy race. 99
2. Central Government Support
Despite early hiccups, it is now clear that the important reforms included
in China's 2005 Renewable Energy Law have been implemented with a
speed and effectiveness that most countries can only envy. 100
Observers believe China's national government offers consistent and
committed support to the greentech sector. They contrast this commitment
with our woeful levels of research and development on renewables, our
inability to agree on national standards for deployment of renewables, and
other signs of relative inactivity, and find our efforts wanting.
In this view, China's authoritarian government is not a barrier to
progress, but a major facilitator of it. A Communist nation with a central
government planning process need not concern itself with pesky hindrances
like the agendas of 538 Senators and Representatives, so it can develop
renewables far more quickly.1l This is hardly the first time that some have
claimed that Communism creates more favorable conditions for a sustained
technological undertaking. In 1957, after the launch of Sputnik, the famed
rocket scientist Wernher von Braun is reputed to have said from his base in
Huntsville, Alabama, that "because of some idiotic bureaucratic impera-
tives, someone else had beaten him to it [a satellite launch]."l02 We know
how the rest of that story turned out in the 1960s.
99. McElwee, supra note 24.
100. RENEWABLES, supra note 47, at 52.
101. Kachan, supra note 74 ("China is making decisions quickly, and isn't encumbered by demo-
cratic process."); Todd Woody, The Next Great Leap Forward: China Powers the Global Green Tech
Revolution, GRIST (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.grist.org/article/2010-01-1 1-china-powers-global-green-
tech-revolution/ ("In a one-party state, a government official saying, 'Make it so,' can remove obstacles
to any given project and allocate resources for its development."); 10 Reasons Why China is the Green-
tech Leader, SOLAR FEEDS (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.solarfeeds.com/green-chip-stocks/14040-10-
reasons-why-china-is-the-cleantech-leader ("And unlike a western democracy, when China's central
leaders make up their minds, action follows quickly."). As an example, the article China Has Already
Surpassed the U.S. in Cleantech notes that "in less time than it took the U.S. DOE to do stage I of an
application review for a 92 MW project in New Mexico, China approved, signed and is ready to begin
construction this year on a 20 times bigger project." Kachan, supra note 74. See also Bradsher, On
Clean Energy, China Skirts Rules, supra note 17 (noting that the Sunzone firm obtained permits for and
constructed a solar panel manufacturing plant in less than a year, far shorter than the process would
taken in the United States).
102. MATTHEW BRZEZINSKI, RED MOON RISING: SPUTNIK AND THE HIDDEN RIVALRIES THAT
IGNITED THE SPACE AGE 166 (2007). See also John Noble Wilford, With Fear and Wonder in its Wake,
Sputnik Lifted Us into the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/25/science/space/25sput.html?pagewanted=all (Sputnik's launch
"plunged Americans into a crisis of self-confidence" and caused them to wonder: "Were the institutions
of liberal democracy any match in competition with an authoritarian communist society?").
272011]
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Those claiming China's government is more efficient at greentech pol-
icy have a blind spot for history, as one usually does not associate "nimble"
with a society that operates by five-year development plans:103 think of the
Soviet Five-Year Plans and Animal Farm.104 Any view of the Chinese
energy policy process that paints government support for greentech as
strong, unwavering, and consistent is overly simplistic and has little to
recommend it. China's National Energy Administration is about to release
a ten-year plan for greentech development, which some find a persuasive
blueprint for comprehensive support (although its details have not yet been
released). 05 However, the reality is that China occasionally struggles to
find consistency in its greentech policies. There are numerous policy op-
tions available,1 06 and China has experimented with a wide variety of
them.107 Some have led to considerable progress,10 8 such as the Renewable
Energy Law and the 2009 stimulus package,109 but others, including fre-
quent reorganizations of the governmental energy bureaucracy, have been
less successful. 110
The most frequently cited instance of government support is direct fi-
nancial aid, in the form of low-interest loans, export promotion, and other
aid such as subsidized land made available to renewable energy develop-
ers. 111 The USTR investigation petition cites five areas in which it believes
the Chinese are acting unfairly, one of which is "prohibited subsidies to
103. See, e.g., Cindy Fan, China's Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010): From "Getting Rich
First" to "Common Prosperity," 47 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 708 (2006), available at
www.sscnet.ucla.edulgeog/downloads/597/300.pdf (discussing the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for 2006-
2010 and its language attempting to correct problems such as income inequality).
104. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1946).
105. Julian L. Wong, Green Hops: It's Been a While! (And the Next May Be for a While), GREEN
LEAP FORWARD (July 31, 2010), http://greenleapforward.com/2010/07/3 1/green-hops-its-been-a-while-
and-the-next-may-be-for-a-while/.
106. See CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 32, at 3 (listing numerous governmental policies
under the headings of Markets, Financing, and Infrastructure); RENEWABLES, supra note 47, at 35-46
(describing policies adopted in nations around the world).
107. Eisen, supra note 2; CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 48-55 (listing and
discussing governmental laws, policies, and programs).
108. Martinot & Junfeng, supra note 50 (discussing impacts of recent policy changes).
109. The $4 trillion RMB ($586 billion) package contained billions of dollars worth of incentives
for green projects. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 50, states that $31 billion of the
stimulus package was for green investments. Caution about that figure is warranted. An analysis by
Julian Wong shows that "All that Glitters is Not Green," in that "bullish" estimates of which specific
parts of the package would have green impact are overstated. Julian L. Wong, How Green is China's
Stimulus Package, GREEN LEAP FORWARD (March 3, 2010),
http://greenleapforward.com/2010/03/03/how-green-is-chinas-stimulus-package/.
110. Eisen, supra note 2; Wong, supra note 69, at 7 (noting that with respect to China's greentech
R&D programs, "while some of these programs have been in place for nearly two decades, it is not
clear that they are yielding the hoped-for results").
111. Bradsher, On Clean Energy, China Skirts Rules, supra note 17.
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green technology." 112 These financial incentives include the Ministry of
Finance's "Special Fund for Wind Manufacturing," the Ministry of Finance
and Ministry of Commerce's "Export Product Research and Development
Fund," and the provision of financing through export credits by China's
Export-Import Bank. 113 The state-owned China Development Bank made
$42 billion in loans in 2010 to solar and wind energy companies,1 14 a sum
that well exceeds comparable financing levels in the United States. 115
Yet some of China's other policies, such as pricing benchmarks for
electricity generated from renewables added to the national electricity grid,
have been anything but consistently encouraging to the greentech sector.
Over the past two years, prices in China's feed-in tariff for solar have been
inconsistent across the country.116 The National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) sets solar on-grid prices, and announced in 2009 that
it intended to set benchmark levels for solar pricing. As of late 2010 it had
not done this, relying instead on ad hoc bidding.117 The most recent project
priced in late summer 2010 involved a consortium of Chinese firms propos-
ing a feed-in tariff of 0.73 renminbi (RMB, $0.108 at 6.8 RMB to the dol-
lar) per kilowatt-hour for a new solar project in the Ningxia region. 118 This
was more than one-third less than the price accepted in a previous project's
winning bid, which suggests that these firms were willing to accept lower
rates in return for their optimism that eventually there will be further de-
velopment of solar power.119 While the winning bidder was not announced,
the low price suggests it may have been a state-owned enterprise (SOE)
that need not show a profit and could undercut a private company's bid.
This hybrid system of state-owned and private companies competing for
the same projects is cited in the USTR investigation petition as disfavoring
competition.120 It is an ongoing challenge to progress in China's energy
112. Pet. for Relief Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended, 63.
113. Id at66-83.
114. Natalie Obiko Pearson, Chinese Government 'Confused' by US. Probe of Green Aid, Trade
Group Says, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 27, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-27/chinese-
govemment-confused-by-u-s-probe-of-green-aid-trade-group-says.html.
115. Joel Kirkland, Tax Cuts, Renewable Energy Grants Attract Unlikely Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/04/16/16climatewire-tax-cuts-renewable-energy-grants-
attract-unl-12659.html (largest program totals $5 billion).
116. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 104 (noting that "substantial policy diver-
gence has occurred" in this area "at local levels across China").
117. Eisen, supra note 2.
118. Jim Bai & Aizhu Chen, China Firms Offer $0.108/kWh Feed-In Rate in Solar Tender:Source,
REUTERS, Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67F2BJ20100816?type=GCA-
GreenBusiness.
119. Id.
120. Pet. for Relief Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended, 95-96.
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system,121 and as one report observes, "lack of competition reduces effi-
ciencies and innovation that come from open and competitive markets." 22
Until 2009, a bidding tender system was also in place for electricity
generated from wind turbines above 50 MW. That system was criticized for
failing to promote wind power development.123 For smaller wind installa-
tions, provincial governments set pricing policies on an ad hoc, project
specific basis, which provided little long-run guidance on pricing. The
USTR investigation petition also claims that these local procurement
processes disfavored foreign firms by being essentially closed to non-
Chinese bidding. 124 A new system of "zonal tariffs" largely replaced the
previous pricing scheme, but it is too early to tell whether it will encourage
more wind power development over the long term.
Observers of the Chinese government's energy and environmental
policies have learned that the Chinese government is not infallible, nor
does it always act as rapidly as some believe.125 No fewer than nineteen
governmental bodies have responsibility for some aspect of greentech poli-
cy.1 26 There are inevitable delays in coordination. Ambitious announce-
ments, as in the case of the solar feed-in tariff, are not always translated
quickly into concrete policies.127 The gap between announcement and im-
121. Wang Mingyuan, Issues Related to the Implementation of China's Energy Law: Analysis of
the Energy Conservation Law and the Renewable Energy Law as Examples, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 225,
248 (2007) (observing that "[tihe lack of open, fair, regulated, and orderly market competition mechan-
isms in the energy sector is a fundamental hindrance to renewable energy development and to the
Renewable Energy Law's implementation"). SOEs continue to be an important part of China's econom-
ic landscape. See Michael Wines, China Fortifies State Businesses to Fuel Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/world/asia/30china.html. For an intriguing analysis that
China's reliance on SOEs will eventually undercut its economic growth, see Paul Denlinger, China's
Outdated Practice of Capitalism, FORBES BLOGS (Aug. 24, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://blogs.forbes.com/china/2010/08/24/chinas-outdated-practice-of-
capitalismf/boxes=Homepagechannels.
122. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 87.
123. See Li JUNFENG, SHI JINGLI, XIE HONGWEN, SONG YANQIN & SHI PENGFEI, A STUDY ON THE
PRICING POLICY OF WIND POWER IN CHINA 1-2 (2006), available at
http://www.gwec.net/fileadmin/documents/Publications/Report%20wind-power-price-
policy/o20china.pdf. Commenting on the report, Li Junfeng, Director of the China Renewable Energy
Industry Association, observed that in China, "wind power is a new industry and it still needs support.
The current pricing policy does not match the goal of supporting wind development, and it has to be
changed." A Study on the Pricing Policy of Wind Power in China, GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL,
http://www.gwec.net/index.php?id=156 (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
124. Pet. for Relief Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended, 96-97.
125. See, e.g., Mingyuan, supra note 121, at 249 (comment of Tsinghua University professor Wang
Mingyuan that in the central government, "the lack of assessment and feedback mechanisms results in
legislation and policy that cannot be modified or improved in a timely fashion during the implementa-
tion").
126. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 44 (listing the agencies and their areas of
responsibility).
127. Eric Savitz, Solar: China Feed-In-Tariff Could Be 2 Years Away, BARRON'S Blogs (Sept. 17,
2009, 2:43 PM), http://blogs.barrons.com/techtraderdaily/2009/09/17/solar-china-feed-in-tariff-could-
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plementation is important, because national proclamations tend to be broad
frameworks requiring implementation by administrative organs of the na-
tional government. Unlike the American system, where public involvement
can help steer the actions of administrative agencies, the Chinese govern-
ment has little accountability to accomplish its advertised objectives.128
Key personnel changes in the inner circle of the Chinese Communist Party
can make for policy reversals or alterations.
The Chinese government's top-down nature creates enormous reliance
on provincial and local governments to implement national policies. Robust
policy announcements by Beijing do not easily translate to reality on the
ground in the provinces,129 and coordination between national and local
officials is always difficult. 130 Implementation at the local level is not al-
ways uniform across the nation. 131 The structure for local enforcement of
national environmental and energy policies is just beginning to develop,
and it lags badly in localities outside of major cities. 132 Local officials of-
ten have incentives built into their job goals to prefer projects that can de-
liver short-term profits, 133 not renewable energy projects that might not pan
out for years.134 Some local governments have direct conflicts of interest
between their responsibilities to promote growth of SOEs and their man-
dates to implement national policies.135
The perception that China's government is unwaveringly committed
to supporting greentech is often accepted uncritically, without these or any
other caveats. Observers may not always grasp the nuances of Chinese
governmental action on greentech and often jump to conclusions that might
be-2-years-away/. This projection was confirmed by the prevalence of ad hoc bidding over the next two
years. See Jim Bai & Aizhu Chen, China Firms Offer $0.108/kWh Feed-in Rate in Solar Tender:
Source, REUTERS, Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67F2BJ20100816. See
Wong, supra note 105 (noting that the mid-2010 bidding was the "latest indication that authorities are
not quite ready with the idea of a national feed-in tariff for solar").
128. See, e.g., Development Trend of China's Administrative Accountability Study, FREE PAPER
DOWNLOAD CENTER (July 3, 2010), http://www.hil38.com/e/?i72718 (noting that "China has just
begun the implementation of administrative accountability").
129. Mingyuan, supra note 121, at 249 (noting that "as China is a large country with unbalanced
regional development, uniform national legislation often fails to consider local characteristics and is not
specific or adaptable to local needs").
130. This marvelous bit of understatement is found in CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note
35, at 91.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 92-93.
133. Mingyuan, supra note 121, at 237 (noting that "[s]ome localities and departments still com-
pare expected growth rate goals, and only talk idly of energy conservation and environmental protec-
tion").
134. Id. at 245 (observing that "most thermal power projects are larger in scale, attract greater
investment, bring about faster results, and are more profitable than renewable energy projects").
135. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 92.
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be erroneous or oversimplified. It is easy to contrast China's supposed
progress with the United States' apparent lack of follow-through. One ex-
ample-implementation of emissions trading schemes-demonstrates how
that rhetoric can miss the mark. In summer 2010, climate bills failed in the
Senate, and it became clear that the United States was not going to adopt a
cap-and-trade scheme regulating greenhouse gas emissions. At the same
time, China announced that it planned to adopt a trading scheme in its new
Five-Year Plan for national economic development. 136 Some pounced on
this contrast, suggesting that China was about to succeed where the United
States was not. 137
A closer look at this announcement suggests otherwise. Even if the
Chinese government follows through on its announced plan, it will take
considerable time to craft an actual scheme and to get it up and running.
Cap-and-trade schemes in Europe and the United States took several years
from the beginning of their design to commencement of operations. 138 The
apparent scope of China's planned effort is laudable, but hardly the sort of
initiative that shows that the United States is lagging. There apparently was
debate about whether "pilot carbon trade projects should start from a se-
lected industry, or a certain area." 139 Thus, it appears that the initial project
as implemented will probably be closer in scope to the utility-only scheme
of the ongoing Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in American northeas-
tern states.140 The United States, it would seem, is not behind, but actually
ahead. 141
This tendency of misperception is reminiscent of the space race era.
Throughout much of the 1950s, we had little hard information on the
136. Li Jing, Carbon Trading in Pipeline, CHINA DAILY, July 22, 2010,
http://chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/22/content_11033249.htm.
137. Friedman, We're Gonna Be Sorry, supra note 6 (noting that "[just as the U.S. Senate was
abandoning plans for a U.S. cap-and-trade system, this article [about the Chinese plan] ran in The China
Daily").
138. See A. Denny Ellerman, The EU Emission Trading Scheme: A Prototype Global System?,
HARV. PROJECT ON INT'L CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, August 2008, at 3, available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Ellermanl1.pdf (describing the progress of the EU-ETS).
139. Jing, supra note 136.
140. Welcome, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://rggi.org/home (last visited Oct. 6,
2010). For descriptions of the RGGI program, see William Funk, Constitutional Implications of Re-
gional CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs: The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in
Point, 27 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 353 (2009), available at
http://www.law.ucla.edu/jelp/Articles/27-2%20ArticleUCLA%20JELP%2027-2%20Funk.pdf; Steven
Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional Impediments to the Regulation of Global Warming, 35
ECOLOGY L.Q. 835 (2008), available at http.#www.boalt.org/elq/documents/elq35-4-04-ferrey-2009-
0309.pdf
141. A carbon trading executive active in the Asian market estimated in 2010 that it would be 2015
before China had a scheme in place. China Renewables to Power Ahead Without CDM, ENERGY CHINA
FORUM (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.energychinaforum.com/news/39477.shtml.
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U.S.S.R.'s activities, and consistently over- or underestimated the nature of
its government's commitment to the space program. Warnings in the popu-
lar press that the U.S.S.R. was about to launch a satellite were roundly
ignored, as many believed the nation was simply incapable of doing So.142
At a Congressional hearing, a Senator laughed at the suggestion that the
U.S.S.R. could soon be in space. 143 Meanwhile, fears about the U.S.S.R.'s
ability to build a bomber capable of striking the United States prompted a
massive buildup of air power and spending on missiles to close the so-
called "missile gap," in which we built more than twenty times as many
planes as the Soviets.144 Those fears later turned out to be overblown, but
by 1957 we had made our commitment, churning out large numbers of
planes while our space program languished.
There may be comparable errors in our evaluation of China's com-
mitment to developing greentech. It is difficult to obtain accurate informa-
tion from China's national government, which is both famously secretive
about its intentions and actions, and prone to frequent releases of propa-
ganda (as any reader of Xinhua knows). 145 Information routinely made
available in the West is often protected in China as state secrets, and recent
efforts to promote a FOIA-like freedom of information regimel 46 have
shown just how difficult it is to understand governmental actions with any-
thing resembling accuracy.147 One example from the greentech sector will
suffice: according to the USTR investigation petition, "there is a lack of
142. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 102, at 136.
143. Id. at 135.
144. Id. at 58; Jacob Neufeld, Technology Push, Colloquium on Contemporary History, NAVAL
HIST. & HERITAGE COMMAND (Sept. 23, 2003), http://www.history.navy.mil/colloquia/cch9c.html
(noting that "[i]n the wake of Sputnik there emerged the so-called 'missile gap,' a highly-publicized
notion that the Soviet Union was poised to surpass the United States in numbers of strategic missiles.");
Wilford, supra note 102 (observing that "[a]n exaggerated estimate of the 'missile gap' became a
rallying cry of the 1960 presidential campaign and may have been crucial in Kennedy's narrow victo-
ry").
145. See generally David Shambaugh, China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes, and
Efficacy, 57 CHINA J. 25 (2007), available at web.rollins.edu/-tlairson/china/chipropaganda.pdf. Sham-
baugh describes the Chinese propaganda system as a "sprawling bureaucratic establishment, extending
into virtually every medium concerned with the dissemination of information." Id. at 27. "Xinhua" is
the Xinhua News Agency, the official press agency of the People's Republic of China, which, Sham-
baugh notes, "has always had a dual role: to report news and to disseminate Party and state propagan-
da." Id. at 44. Many in the West cite stories from Xinhua without this important context.
146. Jamie P. Horsley, China Adopts First Nationwide Open Government Information Regulations,
FREEDOMINFOORG (May 9, 2007), available at
www.law.yale.eduldocuments/pdf/IntellectualLife/ChChinaAdopts_1 stOGIRegulations.pdf
(discussing the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Open Government Information).
147. A 2010 workshop on transparency in reporting of environmental information and accompany-
ing report by the Natural Resources Defense Council found that there had been a "good start on open
information" but that the system had a long way to go. Alex Wang, Assessing the State of Environmen-
tal Transparency in China, SwrrCHBOARD: NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (June 7,
2010), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/awang/assessingthe-state_of environ.html.
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official, detailed information regarding the terms upon which financing is
provided by China ExIm Bank." 148
Recently, government ministries have made considerable efforts to
explain their actions in English. Even when information is available in
English, however, it is often written in a dense Communist prose that
makes it difficult to decipher. A handful of Western observers have made
great strides to parse through the inner workings of the Chinese govern-
mental structure in excellent blogs devoted to China's energy and environ-
mental law and policy.1 49 Yet even their detailed and determined efforts
rely from time to time on hunches and guesswork when the central gov-
ernment has not seen fit to connect the dots about its intentions. Thus,
sweeping pronouncements about the Chinese government's intentions and
policies should be avoided when possible.
3. The Results Speak for Themselves .. .Or Do They?
Commentators routinely invoke greentech deployment statistics to
show that we are losing the green energy race. By some metrics, Chinese
progress is impressive. In 2009, China obtained a much larger share of its
electricity from renewable sources than the United States did (17% versus
8.8%),150 but this figure is skewed by the predominance of hydroelectric
generation in China, 151 especially the output from the mammoth Three
Gorges Dam project.152 China is expanding its use of hydropower, but
because it has controversial environmental impacts and is a mature tech-
nology, it is not often included in discussion of a greentech race.
In solar and wind power, the picture is a bit less clear. China added
13.8 GW of new wind power capacity to 10.0 GW for the United States in
2009,153 but its installed total capacity still trailed that of the United States
(35.1 GW versus 25.8 GW). Those numbers cannot be compared directly,
148. Pet. for Relief Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended, 78.
149. Notable English language blogs on China's environmental and energy policies include CHINA
ENVTL. L., http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/, GREEN L., http://www.greenlaw.org.cn, and
GREEN LEAP FORWARD, http://greenleapforward.com/. In addition, a number of commentators provide
information on Twitter, including energy consultants Chris Brown (using the name "@chrisrbrown")
and Alexander Conrad (@damoc).
150. RENEWABLES, supra note 47, at 59
151. REN21 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES IN CHINA
7 (2009), available at http://www.ren2l.net/pdf/Recommendations-forREPoliciesinChina.pdf
(noting that of the 586.7 terawatt-hours ("TWh") of electricity generated from renewables in China in
2008, all but 22.0 TWh came from hydropower projects).
152. David Biello, The Dam Building Boom: Right Path to Clean Energy?, YALE ENv'T 360 (Feb.
23, 2009), http://e360.yale.edulcontent/feature.mspid=2119.
153. RENEWABLES, supra note 47, at 54 tbl.R2.
[Vol 86: 134
THE NEW ENERGY GEOPOLITICS?
though, as China's wind projects have been less efficient than those else-
where.154 In 2009, China had a mere 0.4 GW of grid-connected solar pho-
tovoltaic capacity, 155 though it pledged to meet a much higher target by
2020.156 The United States had a larger 1.2 GW of installed PV capacity,
still far less than world leader Germany's 9.8 GW. China had substantially
more solar hot water heater capacity and has outdone the United States
almost sixty-fold. 157
At present, then, China is not outstripping the United States in total in-
stalled capacity, but it might if it achieves its ambitious targets for 2020-
30 GW for wind (or possibly 100 GW, according to recent reports that the
targets would be increased) and 1.8 GW for solar PV (or possibly as much
as an astounding 20 GW). 1s The general manager of the State Grid Corpo-
ration has stated that total renewable energy capacity in the nation will
triple to 600 GW by 2020.159 However, that projection should contain the
qualifier that much of the increase will be in hydropower. 160 And apples
should be compared to apples: Europe and the United States also plan to
increase installed capacity substantially above current levels by 2020.161
Even if all the planned greentech is deployed in China, actual utiliza-
tion might lag behind installed capacity.162 Solar and wind installations
154. See CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 87-88 (discussing reasons for lower
efficiency in earlier installed wind farms).
155. RENEWABLES, supra note 47, at 55 tbl.R4. China did have more installed capacity per unit of
gross domestic product, however. Wong, supra note 60.
156. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 36 fig.21; see also LI JUNFENG, WANG
SICHENG, ZHANG MINJI & MA LINGJUAN, CHINA SOLAR PV REPORT 11 tbl.6 (2007), available at
www.wwfchina.org/english/downloads/ClimateChange/china-pv-report-en.pdf (comparing China's
goal to estimates of installed PV capacity in other nations).
157. RENEWABLES, supra note 47, at 56 tblR5.
158. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 36 fig.21. The lower targets are contained in
the Medium and Long Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy, and the higher figures are based
on reports of new targets likely to be contained in the National Energy Administration's ten-year plan.
See, e.g., Kevin Mo, Go with Wind: China to Dramatically Boost its Wind Power Capacity, Again,
SWITCHBOARD: NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (July 21, 2009),
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/kmo/go with wind china to-dramatic.html. But see Charles McEl-
wee, A Mighty Wind, CHINA ENVTL. L. (May 6, 2009),
http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/2009/05/06/a-mighty-wind/#more-1697 (stating, "I'm not
believing [new targets] until I see a formally amended copy of China's Medium & Long-Term Renew-
able Energy Development Plan").
159. Besta Shankar, China Clean Power Capacity to Reach 600 GW by 2020: Report, INT'L BUS.
TIMEs, July 27, 2010, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/38685/20100727/iea-clean-energy-state-grid-
corp-hydropower-smart-grid-renewable-energy-wind-solar-carbon-dioxide-em.htm. Current installed
capacity of all renewables in China is 226 GW. RENEWABLES, supra note 47, at 10.
160. According to projections about increased 2020 targets, 300 GW of capacity-far more than
wind and solar combined-would be in hydropower. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at
36 fig.21.
161. JUNFENG ET AL., supra note 156, at 11 tbl.6 (listing predictions for 2020).
162. Eisen, supra note 2.
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experience difficulties in connecting to the country's transmission grid, so
actual power supplied falls short of capacity.163 A national effort to up-
grade the grid is underway,1 64 but there are considerable challenges today
involved in dispatching solar and wind power resources. The "mandated
market share" requirement applies to the country's major utilities and re-
quires each to obtain 8% of capacity and 3% of actual generation from
renewables by 2020.165 A 2008 report concluded that even the near-term
requirement that utilities get 1% of actual generation from renewables in
2010 would be "challenging."' 6 6
Some point to a different metric: annual investment by Chinese firms
in renewable energy technology. Asset financing levels in China have re-
cently outpaced those of American firms.167 According to a recent report
by the Pew Charitable Trusts,168 "China took the top spot for overall clean
energy finance and investment in 2009, pushing the United States into
second place."169 In 2009, Chinese spending (excluding R&D) totaled
$34.6 billion to $18.6 billion for the United States,1 70 although the same
report did note that "overall clean energy finance and investment in the
United States more than doubled during the past five years."171 However,
as the spending levels are within the same order of magnitude, it does not
163. Bradbord Plumer, Nice Wind Farm, But So What?, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2010),
http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-vine/7523 1/nice-wind-farm-so-what (noting that because of the challenges
in upgrading the grid, "a lot of that wind and solar capacity could end up getting wasted, and some of it
already does").
164. See, e.g., Martinot & Junfeng, supra note 50 (discussing grid-related provisions in the recent
update to the Renewable Energy Law).
165. These targets were specified in the Medium and Long Term Plan for Renewable Energy
Development. For a discussion of this, see Chunbo Ma & Lining He, From State Monopoly to Renewa-
ble Portfolio: Restructuring China's Electric Utility, 36 ENERGY POL'Y 1697, 1706 (2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=1290737. See also Eric Martinot & Li Junfeng,
Renewable Energy Policy Update For China, China's Latest Leap: An Update on Renewables Policy,
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (July 21, 2010),
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/print/article/2010/07/renewable-energy-policy-
update-for-china; GWEC Reports on Wind Power in China, OFFSHORE WIND (Apr. 26, 2010),
http://www.offshorewind.biz/2010/04/26/gwec-reports-on-wind-power-in-china/.
166. Ma & He, supra note 165, at 1707; see also Christina Larson, A Climate Dilemma for China:
The World Leader in Economic Growth and Carbon Emissions Faces Competing Forces, CENTER FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 12, 2009),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/global-climatechangelobby/articles/entry/1801/ (stating
that utilities were struggling to meet the requirement).
167. RENEWABLES, supra note 47, at 28 (stating that Chinese asset financing was $29.2 billion in
2009, up from $22 billion in 2008 and nearly two times the U.S. figure of $10.7 billion). See also
Jeremy van Loon & Alex Morales, China Surges Past U.S., Europe in Clean-Energy Asset Financing,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, July 13, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-13/china-
surges-past-u-s-europe-in-clean-energy-asset-financing.html.
168. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 14.
169. Id at 7.
170. Id at 7 fig.4.
171. Id at 10.
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seem that this in and of itself is reason for panic. The real fear with respect
to financing levels seems to be that if the United States does not adopt pro-
gressive climate measures (including a cap-and-trade law), it will fall fur-
ther behind China.172 As I discuss below, that argument militates in favor
of renewed efforts in the United States to strengthen climate policies, not a
policy of greentech warring with China.
The market data has inherent appeal as a set of statistics that seems to
neatly capture the spirit of American inaction on renewables. What is its
real significance, however? Does it matter, except for international brag-
ging rights, whether the United States or China occupies the top spot in a
table of solar and wind investment or installed capacity? Would it even
matter if China's installed capacity were an order of magnitude larger than
that of the United States?
The total investment figures or gigawatts of renewable energy capaci-
ty installed should not be viewed as a complete measure of the success of a
national greentech policy. Those figures do not tell us how China is moving
toward reducing its usage of fossil fuels and achieving climate goals. The
stakes are very high. As I will discuss below, China must have sufficient
domestic policies in place (including greentech deployment plans) if the
global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is to succeed.
In the overall energy picture, China's record is mixed. China is adding
renewable energy capacity rapidly, but it is much more dependent on con-
ventional fossil fuel generation than the United States. Coal accounts for a
staggering 70% of the nation's electricity generation capacity.1 73 Even
large deployment of renewables will not enable China to reduce that num-
ber substantially over the next decade.174 And that only tells part of the
story. In recent years, China has become a voracious energy user. Its rapid
annual growth and increasing appetite of its citizens for modern conve-
niences and luxuries has resulted in rapid increases in energy demand.175 In
2010, China achieved the dubious milestone of surpassing the United States
172. Id. (noting that "[d]omestic policy decisions appear to have shifted the competitive positions
of G-20 member countries").
173. China's Power Generation Goes Greener with Total Capacity up 10%, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY (Jan. 7, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/07/content 12771880.htm (coal-
fired power accounted for 74.6% of the nation's 874 million kW of electricity generation capacity in
2009); U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INDEP. STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, COUNTRY
ANALYSIS BRIEFS: CHINA (2009), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/pdf.pdf (2006 data); Ma & He,
supra note 165, at 1698.
174. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 40 (noting that "even if China were to
achieve its target of deriving 20% of energy from renewable sources by 2020, most of the non-
renewable energy would still be derived from coal"); Ma & He, supra note 165, at 1707.
175. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 32-33.
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as the world's largest primary energy user. 176 On the whole, its industries
are far less energy-efficient than those in the United States and Japan.177
The government's initiatives have helped improve energy efficiency,178 but
China still has a long way to go.
To satisfy its increasing energy demand, China has added much more
conventional generation capacity than greentech.179 An article on China
and greentech put this bluntly, stating that "China's investment in renewa-
ble energy and other green technologies is miniscule compared to the re-
sources devoted to its continued building of coal-fired power plants and
efforts to secure dirty oil shale supplies in Canada and elsewhere." 80 In
2009, China began construction of a mammoth 13.6 GW power base fueled
by coal in Gansu province, the same location planned for a much-praised
10 GW wind farm.181 The amount of new investments in conventional
technology made up over one-third of the 134.4 billion RMB (just under
$20 billion) spent in the first half of 2010, according to the National Energy
Board.182 Some new plants use technology designed to reduce emissions
176. Shai Oster & Spencer Swartz, World News: Beying Disputes IEA Data on Energy, WALL ST.
J., July 21, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/NAWSJPUB:SB 10001424052748703720504575378243321158992.htm
I (citing statistics from the International Energy Agency that China used 2.252 billion tons of oil equiva-
lent in 2009 as compared to 2.17 billion tons of oil equivalent for the United States); see also Ann
Carlson, China's Growth in Energy Usage Truly Alarming, LEGAL PLANET: ENvT'L L. & POL'Y BLOG
(May 7, 2010), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2010/05/07/chinas-growth-in-energy-usage-truly-
alarming/; Rezny, supra note 56 (citing the report and Chinese criticism that the "second largest con-
sumer" story does not give enough weight to China's greentech investments and carbon intensity tar-
gets).
177. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 40; U.S. and China Vie for Clean Energy
Leadership, supra note 40.
178. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 38-39.
179. Two Energy Giants: A Contrast in Approach, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Apr. 22, 2010),
http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2010/04/22/two-energy-giants-a-contrast-in-approach/
(tables showing Conventional Thermal Generating Capacity Additions in China outstripped all rene-
wables additions-and far outpaced non-hydropower renewables-between 2005-2008).
180. Woody, supra note 101; see also Two Energy Giants: A Contrast in Approach, supra note 179
("The size and scope of [China's] investments in conventional forms of energy dwarf their commitment
to 'green energy."').
181. Charlie McElwee, China Starts Construction on 13.6GW Coal-Fired Power Base, CHINA
ENvTL. L. (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/2009/08/10/china-starts-
construction-on-136gw-coal-fired-power-base/. One Chinese professor claims that provincial govern-
ments have stronger incentives to build conventional plants than greentech facilities. Mingyuan, supra
note 121, at 244-45 ("[E]ven though the State has made clear that renewable energy exploitation and
utilization is an area of high priority and that key public and private actors are encouraged to be in-
volved, some local governments are enthusiastic about, and spare no effort in, starting thermal power
plants, while renewable energy generation projects are often 'pending discussion.' The objective cause
of this phenomenon is that most thermal power projects are larger in scale, attract greater investment,
bring about faster results, and are more profitable than renewable energy projects.").
182. [ 2 National Energy Board Held the First
Half of 2010, the Economic Situation of the Energy Conference],
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from coal burning, and the government is moving to retire small, higher
polluting coal plants,183 but as of 2010, China "uses more coal than the
United States, Europe, and Japan combined."1 84
In short, China is adding to its greentech portfolio, but has a long way
to go to address rapidly increasing demand for energy and to lessen the
impacts of its growing economy on climate change. That context should be
a central part of any discussion about the "clean energy race" that touts
China's achievements in deploying solar panels and wind turbines or in
greentech financing levels.
B. Invoking the Space Race Metaphor is Counter-Productive for Ad-
dressing Climate Change
While many believe the United States is losing the green energy race,
the reality does not yet match the rhetoric.185 However, there is supposedly
much more at stake than the success of each nation's greentech sector.
Without a greentech surge, the United States cannot achieve reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions. A push to develop more renewable energy is an
important component of virtually any credible strategy for reducing carbon
emissions in the United States, from the legislation that passed the House
of Representatives in 2009, to state and regional efforts and strategies pro-
posed by independent interest groups.186
Failure to make progress on greentech could hamper the entire effort
to address climate change, which, to some, makes this a matter of national
survival. The emerging literature on "threat multiplication" is an attempt to
address the relationship between climate change and national security.
While a comprehensive discussion of this intriguing literature is beyond the
A ti A [National Development and Reform Commission],
http://nyj.ndrc.gov.cn/ggtz/t20l00721_362050.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
183. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 39.
184. Keith Bradsher, China Outpaces U.S. in Cleaner Coal-Fired Plants, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/1/worldlasia/1l1coal.html.
185. See, e.g., Press Release, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Joined At The Hip: The US-China
Clean Energy Relationship: Bloomberg New Energy Finance Study Debunks Myths About US-China
Clean Energy Relationship (May 19, 2010), bnef.com/Download/pressreleases/l 16/pdffile/ (comment
of Michael Liebreich, CEO of Bloomberg New Energy Finance, that "[iut is easy to paint clean energy
trade between the US and China in terms of winners and losers, but the relationship defies simplistic
assumptions").
186. For a description of state and federal programs, see generally PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://pewclimate.org; Joseph Romm, One BriefShining Moment for Clean Energy:
Passage of the First Climate Bill in the House Is a Big First Step to Cut Global Warming. But It's Not
Enough, SALON (June 27, 2009),




scope of this article, a basic understanding of it is useful to evaluating any
claims that "losing" to the Chinese imperils our survival. To begin with,
the "threat multiplication" idea assumes there is considerable uncertainty
about how the international community will respond politically and eco-
nomically to climate change. Generally speaking, uncertainty is present in
two different but related situations. The first is that failure to address cli-
mate change impacts, like military conflict, has the potential to destabilize
a society. 187 Recognizing this potential, experts in our military are paying
increased attention to climate concerns. 188 Within China, there are also
signs that policymakers view climate insecurity as a potential threat to the
nation. 189 The second usage of "threat multiplication" is that where tension
already exists, climate impacts can exacerbate it.190 Stress on the environ-
ment can increase existing conflicts in a region, or between individual na-
tions. 191 As one observer notes, "climate change could drive a more
collaborative approach in inter-state relations or it could exacerbate ten-
sions between and within countries, leading to a 'politics of insecurity' as
countries focus on protecting themselves against the impact."1 92
187. See, e.g., Brian Merchant, US. Navy Vice Admiral: Climate Change is a Threat Multiplier
(Video), TREEHUGGER (JUNE 24, 2010), http://www.treehugger.com/files/2010/06/us-navy-vice-
admiral-climate-change-threat-multiplier.php.
188. See US. National Security Requires Cleantech Leadership - Report, SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS
(July 30, 2010), http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/20764 (discussing
report by fifteen top-ranking admirals and generals calling for American greentech leadership); Tack-
ling a National Security Challenge, NAT'L SECURITY NETWORK (July 21, 2010),
http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1672 (climate change is a "threat multiplier" for conflict).
The Central Intelligence Agency has opened a Center on Climate Change and National Securi-
ty to analyze the threat to national security posed by climate issues. Press Releases & Statements, Cent.
Intelligence Agency, CIA Opens Center on Climate Change and National Security (Sept. 25, 2009),
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/center-on-climate-change-and-
national-security.html.
189. China and Climate Security, Event Summary, WOODROW WILSON INT'L CENTER FOR
SCHOLARS (Oct. 6, 2009),
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction-events.event-summary&eventid=553283.
190. See generally CLEO PASKAL, GLOBAL WARRING: How ENVIRONMENTAL, ECONOMIC, AND
POLITICAL CRISES WILL REDRAW THE WORLD MAP (2010); Nick Mabey, A Transatlantic Agenda on
Climate Security?, E3G (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.e3g.org/programmes/foreign-articles/a-
transatlantic-agenda-on-climate-security/; Paul Rogers, A Global Threat Multiplier, OPEN DEMOCRACY
(Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/a globalthreat-multiplier; Climate Security,
EASTWEST INSTITUTE, http://www.ewi.info/climate-security (last visited Oct. 6, 2010) (East-West
Initiative program on climate security).
191. See, e.g., BRUCE VAUGHN, NICOLE T. CARTER, PERVAZE A. SHEIKH & RENE JOHNSON,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41358, SECURITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN PAKISTAN I (2010) available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41358.pdf (discussing the environment in and around Pakistan,
stating that "the potential effects of climate change could act as a threat multiplier to national security
[and] might exacerbate existing threats to national security such as weak governance, poverty, and
armed insurgents").
192. Nick Mabey, Managing Climate Security (2), CHINA DIALOGUE (Jan. 16, 2009),
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/2690.
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What does this mean in the context of the green energy race, and
which threat do commentators have in mind when they talk about China?
Parsing through language to ascertain just what is intended can be tricky.
Some simply state that action on greentech is important to our "national
security," without elaboration. 193 Some state directly that danger posed by
climate impacts poses as much of a threat to our survival as the U.S.S.R.
did in the 1950s,1 94 but this refers to the magnitude of the threat posed by
climate impacts, not by China.
I assume for the moment that this essential concept is correct. With so
much uncertainty involved (What climate change impacts will a given na-
tion have? How will they affect the political and economic system?) and a
body of literature that is just beginning to grapple with this complexity,
however, that is far from settled. Another assumption relates to who judges
the impacts on national security from climate change: policymakers and
climate analysts? Or the general public? This can make quite a difference.
The consensus in the United States on the imperative to move forward with
strong climate action is hardly universal. Public polls reflect majorities in
favor of policies such as climate legislation, 195 but also sentiment skeptical
of the underlying climate science. 196 I will assume that those concerned
about climate insecurity will eventually convince the American public of
the increased need to act, even though Americans today generally do not
193. See, e.g., US. National Security Requires Cleantech Leadership, supra note 188 ("Like the
space race, the race to develop and own clean energy technology has enormous and long-range strategic
implications for national security."); Brian Wynne, Winning the Race with Electric Drive, Comment to
Can the U.S. Keep up in Clean Energy Race?, NAT'L J. EXPERT BLOGS: ENERGY & ENv'T (Aug. 2,
2010, 5:37 PM), http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2010/08/can-the-us-keep-up-in-clean-en.php (com-
ment of Brian Wynne, President, Electric Drive Transportation Association, that "[t]he clean energy
race has important national security, economic and environmental implications for the U.S.").
194. See, e.g., Thomas Homer-Dixon, Terror in the Weather Forecast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/24/opinion/24homer-dixon.html (describing climate change as "just
as dangerous - and more intractable - than the arms race between the United States and the Soviet
Union during the cold war").
195. Alex Kaplun, If Polls Say 'Yes' to a Climate Bill, Why Do Lawmakers Say 'Maybe'?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/01/26/26climatewire-if-polls-say-yes-to-a-
climate-bill-why-do-la-41121 .html.
196. See, e.g., Spencer Magloff, Poll: Americans More Skeptical About Global Warming, CBS
NEWS, Mar. I1, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20000326-503544.html (stating that
in a March 2010 poll, "[f]ifty percent of respondents believe human activities are causing a rise in the
earth's temperature, while [forty-six] percent say the rise is due to natural causes"). The increase in
skeptical sentiment can be traced in large part to "Climategate," the attempt to discredit climate science
researchers based on e-mail messages from the Climate Research Unit in England. Id. For a typical anti-
science article on Climategate, see John Lott, Why You Should Be Hot and Bothered About 'Climate-
gate,' Fox NEWS, Nov. 24, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2009/ll/24/john-lott-climate-
change-emails-copenhagen/. The researchers were eventually vindicated in an independent inquiry, see




believe that their survival as a nation depends on addressing the threat
posed by climate change.
With these assumptions in place, we can represent the threat multipli-
cation concept with these two simplified equations:
EQUATION 1:
Existing military threat (military tension, terrorism, secession
movements, weak governance, etc.)
(x) threat of climate change impacts (multiplier)
= intensified military threat
EQUATION 2:
No current military threat
(x) threat of climate change impacts (multiplier)
= intensified threat to national status
Commentators on the green energy race speak about both the threat in
the greentech sector and the resulting consequences for climate change,
often in the same article. The result is a conflation of the two different ra-
tionales for responding to China's greentech ascendancy. For that reason,
claims that greentech competition with China poses a threat to the United
States invoke a different equation that should be represented as follows:
EQUATION 3:
Existing economic threat (threat to dominate the greentech sector)
(x) threat of climate change impacts (multiplier)
= intensified threat to national status
The first variable in Equation 3 is different from that of Equation 1,
because China is not perceived as a military threat to the United States.
China's position in the world concerns many Americans, and the "race"
rhetoric capitalizes on that fact. However, public polling reflects a populace
worried predominantly about China's potential for economic dominance. 197
A recent article puts it succinctly: "For China, Will Money Bring Pow-
197. See, e.g., John Pomfret & Jon Cohen, Poll Shows Concern About American Influence Waning
as China's Grows, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/aricle/2010/02/24/AR2010022405168.html (summarizing results of public polling).
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er?"198 Much ink has been spilled on that issue, and there are many "doom-
merchants predicting that China will topple America from its pre-
eminence."1 99 At present, however, there is little risk from China's mili-
tary. The Defense Department's 2010 report to Congress suggests that Chi-
na is spending some of its economic wealth on its military, 200 but falls far
short of casting China as a present threat. Americans are afraid they will
lose their jobs to the Chinese, not their lives. Fear is a great motivator, it is
often said, but there are no calls for construction of fallout shelters or duck-
and-cover drills in American classrooms.
The situation in the Cold War era was far different. For over a decade
before 1957, Americans were gripped by public fear that the U.S.S.R. was
about to attack the United States. This in turn made them willing to believe
virtually anything about Sputnik, whether or not it was true. Even though
Sputnik was a 184-pound satellite with only the capability to broadcast a
radio signal back to Earth, 201 widespread press reports had it brandishing
missiles aimed at American cities. 202 The resulting clamor to ramp up the
American space program was animated by fear that we would be attacked
if we did not have the ability to do so ourselves. Sputnik dominated the
national defense discussion for many years after its launch, in a manner
well out of proportion to its actual capabilities.203
This contrast is so striking that it makes no sense to cast the threat
from China in military terms. Therefore, Equation 3 "computes" in the
same way as Equation 1 only if climate change impacts are a multiplier to
an economic threat. There is one further complication, as the second varia-
ble in Equations 1 and 3 (climate change impacts) is not identical. The
impacts in Equation 3 would result from failures of American greentech
policies in conjunction with other failures to address climate change. Equa-
tion 1 assumes that the United States fails to address climate change as a
198. Piers Brendon, For China, Will Money Bring Power?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/opinion/22brendon.html.
199. Id.
200. U.S. OFFICE OF SEC'Y OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2010), available at
www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010 CMPR Final.pdf; see David Isenberg, China Threat: Now You See
It, Now You Don't, ASIA TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LHI9Ad01.html
for a discussion of the report.
201. Wilford, supra note 102.
202. Id.
203. HERBERT F. YORK, RACE TO OBLIVION: A PARTICIPANT'S VIEW OF THE ARMS RACE 106
(1970), available at http://www.learnworld.com/ZNW/LWText.York.RaceToOblivion.html (observing
that "[t]he successful launching of the Soviet satellite was inflated by design and circumstance far out
of proportion to its real technological and strategic significance into a specter of menace which haunted
America for years").
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society, but does not specify how that will happen. By contrast, Equation 3
assumes a specific failure of governmental policy. For the purposes of
analysis, however, we will assume identical impacts. The central question
then presents itself squarely: Do climate change impacts multiply the exist-
ing economic threat in the same fashion as Equation 1?
The economic impact of losing the greentech race might be significant
(although, as noted above, I believe the United States is not "losing").
However, combining fear of China's economic growth with the fear of
climate change impacts is not at all the same math as in Equation 1, which
premises the multiplying effect on pre-existing conflict between nations.
As the Quadrennial Defense Review puts it, "[w]hile climate change alone
does not cause conflict, it may act as an accelerant of instability or con-
flict." 204 More flashpoints and more unpredictability of a military response
can be expected. So, for example, one might expect the negative impacts of
climate change to contribute to a higher incidence of terrorism. 205 Climate
impacts can also increase the costs of waging war by, for example, increas-
ing the price of necessary fuels. 206
In greentech race commentary, language like "race" and "new Sput-
nik" makes no distinction between economic and military conflict. The
entire linguistic framework of the greentech "race" invokes the tension of
the Cold War era in the hope that the nation will perceive a threat from
China. The language is far too loaded to pretend otherwise. The argument
is that if China deploys greentech more aggressively than we do, it has a
better chance of resisting climate insecurity. This leaves the reader to as-
sume that this threat is tantamount to the threat of China "attacking" us
with policies designed to ensure its survival at the expense of ours. Yet the
situation is much more like the math of Equation 2: climate insecurity,
while real, is separate from and partly related to the threat of losing the
greentech race. The failure to address climate change stems from a whole
host of poor governmental and private sector decisions, including but hard-
ly limited to failing to promote greentech adequately. The call to action is
not to portray China as a threat, but to do something about the real threat,
that is, to address climate security by taking comprehensive actions.
204. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 85 (2010), available at
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR as of 12Feb10_1000.pdf.
205. CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSES CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 44 (2007), available at
http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/National%20Security%/20and%20the%20Threat%/ 200fo2OCli
mate%20Change.pdf.
206. MICHAEL DAVIDSON, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, CLIMATE SECURITY IN EAST
ASIA: NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR NON-TRADITIONAL COOPERATION 1 (2010), available at
http://csis.org/files/publication/pacl025.pdf.
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To do this, we need to confront a powerful reality: the United States
and China are interdependent, not independent competitors. 207 We need
China to take the very actions some would posit as competition. This, as
some have noted, makes the USTR investigation especially unwelcome. 208
Moreover, this is very different from the space race era. In the 1950s, if the
U.S.S.R. took the action that many feared, it could have destroyed the
United States. The situation today could not be more different. Without its
greentech efforts and other measureS209 such as its announced goal to re-
duce the "carbon intensity" of its economy (CO 2 emissions per unit of
GDP),210 China's rapidly increasing energy demand and huge spending on
conventional technology would add considerably to greenhouse gas emis-
sions.211 There will be no effective global reduction of emissions that does
not include the United States and China,212 because they are by far the
207. See, e.g., Wong, supra note 69, at 11 (noting that "the 'clean energy race' is not a zero-sum
game").
208. Bradford Plumer, Should We Start a Solar Panel Trade War with China?, NEW REPUBLIC
BLOG (Sept. 9, 2010, 4:10 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/77566/should-we-start-solar-panel-trade-war-
china ("a far more effective way to strengthen the U.S. clean-energy industry would be to boost domes-
tic demand . . . than through a solar-panel trade war").
209. See China and Climate Change, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://www.pewclimate.org/policycenter/intemational_policy/china.cfn (last visited Oct. 6, 2010)
(fact sheets on specific issues and strategies).
210. China's President, Hu Jintao, stated in September that China's next five-year plan would
include a new goal to reduce carbon intensity-CO2 emissions per unit of GDP-from 2005 levels by
2020 by a "notable margin." Julian L. Wong, China's Carbon Intensity Plans and its Impact on Climate
Progress, GREEN LEAP FORWARD, http://greenleapforward.com/2009/09/25/chinas-carbon-intensity-
plans-and-its-impact-on-climate-progress/ (last updated Sept. 30, 2009). In November 2009, it an-
nounced that number was a reduction of 40% from 2005 levels by 2020. Edward Wong & Keith
Bradsher, China Joins US. in Pledge of Hard Targets on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/27/science/earth/27climate.html.
There are already signs that this goal will be difficult to meet. In early fall 2010, China was
poised to miss a target set by the 11 V Five-Year Guidelines, CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note
35, at 39, for reducing the energy intensity of its industries between 2005 and 2010 by 20%. China
Closes Factories as Green Deadline Looms, ENERGY CHINA FORUM (Aug. 24, 2010),
http://www.energychinaforum.com/news/39598.shtml. According to one consultant quoted in this
article, "[i]f Beijing fails to hit the 2010 target by a wide margin, its credibility on climate change
commitments will be subject to a great deal of international scepticism." Id. (quoting Damien Ma of the
Eurasia Group consulting firm).
211. Studies by the McKinsey consulting firm and the United Kingdom's Tyndall Centre find that
under alternative scenarios of projected growth, China must take drastic measures to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions or suffer considerable increases by 2030. TAO WANG & JIM WATSON, SUSSEx ENERGY
GROUP & TYNDALL CTR. FOR CLIMATE RESEARCH, CHINA'S ENERGY TRANSITION: PATHWAYS FOR
LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT (2009), available at
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sussexenergygroup/documents/china report forweb.pdf; MCKINSEY & CO.,
CHINA's GREEN REVOLUTION: PRIORITIZING TECHNOLOGIES TO ACHIEVE ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 11 (2009), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/locations/greaterchina/mckonchina/reports/china greenrevolutionreport.p
df.
212. See, e.g., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A ROADMAP FOR U.S.-CHINA COLLABORATION ON
CARBON CAPTURE AND SEQUESTRATION 12 (2009), available at
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/11 /pdf/china ccs.pdf (observing that "[i]f these two countries
2011]1 45
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
world's two largest emitters of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas-
es. 213 Failure by either nation to reduce its emissions would imperil the
entire global effort. 214 We should encourage and support China's efforts,
not consider them a threat to our national wellbeing.2 15
Rather than creating the scorched earth of a "greentech war," 216 both
nations can benefit from collaboration that takes advantages of the respec-
tive strengths of each.217 The urgency to do this is compelling. No nation
has ever grown so rapidly as China is growing now, and no nation has had
to address such daunting environmental challenges at the same time as it
has pursued such rapid growth. 218 This poses major hurdles to tackling
climate change that must be surmounted by nations working together. And
there are not just two nations involved, but the whole world. 219 The planet
is in peril if we do not all act together with concerted, targeted efforts. Ra-
ther than creating a two-nation race, we should encourage China's domestic
policies and the climate change collaborations of the "BRIC" developing
economies (Brazil, Russia, and India, in addition to China). 220
cannot find a way to come together to jointly address the problems caused by these emissions, it is
highly unlikely that the world will be able to agree on a strategy for effective mitigation any time
soon").
213. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 343 tbl.11.19
(2008), available at http://www.eia.gov/FTPROOT/multifuel/038408.pdf (in 2006, China emitted 6,018
MMT of CO 2 compared to the United States' 5,903 MMT).
214. "China is on track to overwhelm the global effort to address climate change." Challenges and
Opportunities for U.S.-China Cooperation on Climate Change Before the Sen. Committee on Foreign
Relations, 111th Cong. 16 (2009), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=113654&coll=0
(statement of Elizabeth Economy, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director, Asia Studies, Council on
Foreign Relations).
215. Bradsher, On Clean Energy, China Skirts Rules, supra note 17 (citing comments of Zhao
Feng, Sunzone's general manager, that "the world should appreciate the generous assistance of Chinese
government agencies to the country's clean energy industries. That support has made possible a sharp
drop in the price of renewable energy and has helped humanity address global warming").
216. McElwee, supra note 24.
217. See, e.g., Press Release, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, supra note 185 ("The two nations
may be in competition, but the big win for both of them would be to drive the cost of a clean power
generation below the cost of fossil fuels."); Christina Larson, America's Unfounded Fears of a Green-
Tech Race with China, YALE ENv'T 360 (Feb. 8, 2010),
http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2238 (quoting Shanghai-based American entrepreneur
Richard Brubaker's statement that "[tihe clean-tech war is overblown from the start" and discussing
how "the green-tech 'race' is not one that one side wins and the other loses, but a scenario where part-
nerships are sought out and the final equation doesn't have to be a zero-sum game"); Wong, supra note
69, at 11.
218. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 35.
219. The website of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change contains a
wealth of information on global responses to climate change, including the Kyoto Protocol, Copenha-
gen Accord, and many more documents. See UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
220. See, e.g., BRIC Countries' Think-Tanks Discuss Climate Change, CHINA.ORG.CN (Apr. 15,
2010), http://www.china.org.cn/world/nuclear-bric summits/2010-04/15/content_19823233.htm.
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Nationalistic rhetoric on climate change (as best embodied in the
USTR investigation) will have high costs. Creating near-term tension
would be especially unfortunate for the U.S.-China relationship on climate
matters, which is complex, but not marked by the same animosity as Amer-
ica's relationship with the U.S.S.R. in the 1950s. The two nations have
occasionally criticized each other's progress toward reducing greenhouse
gas emissions, and China is not reticent about highlighting its stronger pro-
grams (greentech promotion) and downplaying weaker ones (lack of bind-
ing nationwide emissions limits). 221 The two nations have ongoing tensions
on a whole host of sensitive topics, 222 but have worked productively with
each other to address climate change.223 Some note that collaboration on
climate issues could have a positive impact on the entire U.S.-China dialo-
gue, 224 although the USTR investigation threatens that optimistic out-
look. 225
In the two-year period of international negotiations between the prom-
ulgation of the Bali Action Plan and the December 2009 Copenhagen
summit, there were numerous cooperative activities between the two na-
tions. The highest level of talks took place under the auspices of the U.S.-
221. See China and the US: This House Believes that China is Showing More Leadership than
America in the Fight Against Climate Change, ECONOMIST DEBATES (Nov. 25, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/421 ("China has succeeded in deflecting attention from
how much carbon it has emitted and will continue to emit to how much carbon it has prevented from
being emitted. There is no question that China has run a slick public relations campaign, but it's not all
smoke and mirrors. China's efforts to improve energy security and industrial efficiency do have the
effect of reducing the rate of growth of its carbon emissions." (comment of Charles R. McElwee)).
222. There are many books, articles, and studies that analyze the U.S.-China relationship, and it
would take an entire bookshelf to list them all. See, e.g., Dan Edwards, New China Books Roundup,
BEUINGER BLOG (Aug. 26, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.thebeijinger.com/blog/2010/08/26/New-
China-Books-Roundup. A useful starting point for a list and brief discussion of the issues between the
two nations is KERRY DUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33877, CHINA-U.S. RELATIONS:
CURRENT ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY (2007), available at as-
sets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33877 2007122 l.pdf. One recent flashpoint has involved censorship and the
Internet. See, e.g., Jessica Guynn, Google Takes a Side Step in Censorship Dance with China, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 22, 2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-03-22/business/sc-biz-0323-google--
20100322 _google-china-hong-kong-china-s-intemet.
223. For general discussions of these meetings, see Michael Wines, In China, Pelosi Calls for
Cooperation On Climate, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/world/asia/28pelosi.html; U.S. Experts Welcome China's Pledge
on Carbon Emission Cuts, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 27, 2009),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-l1/27/content_12549647.htm.
224. Michael Davidson, US, China: A Green Security Blanket?, Asia Times, May 14, 2010, (noting
that climate cooperation could "dwarf existing military cooperation and help stabilize the bilateral
relationship").
225. The Chinese official response to the USTR investigation was not especially heart-warming, as
one might expect. See Michael Forsythe & Feifei Shen, China's Zhang Says Obama Seeking 'Votes'
with Clean Energy Race, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 18, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-
18/china-s-zhang-says-obama-seeking-votes-with-clean-energy-subsidy-probe.html.
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China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. 226 Discussions also took place
during 2009 with other world leaders at the Pittsburgh G-20 summit 227 and
the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate. 228 There was even
talk during 2009 of the two nations forming a sort of "G-2" to cooperate on
financial and climate matters, though that never materialized. 229 The two
nations have pledged several times to take mutual action to address climate
change, 230 and while the promises are often hortatory, the ongoing discus-
sion does have important value in strengthening the bilateral relation-
ship. 231 Advocating a strategy of competition with the Chinese undercuts
these activities.
Continued antagonistic rhetoric about a clean energy race will make it
difficult to conduct cooperative efforts in energy and environmental mat-
ters. Unlike the near-complete scientific secrecy that marked the Cold War
era, 232 China and the United States are working to develop technology
together. Under the China-U.S. Science and Technology Agreement, the
Department of Energy has twelve ongoing initiatives with China,233 includ-
ing electric vehicle 234 and carbon capture and storage development initia-
226. US.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
http://www.ustreas.gov/initiatives/us-china/ (last updated June 10, 2010). See CHINA GREENTECH
INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 58, for a discussion of S&ED activities.
227. See Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT,
http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2010).
228. See Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/climate/rnem/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2010).
229. See Elizabeth Economy & Adam Segal, Time to Defriend China, FOREIGN POL'Y (May 24,
2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/24/time-to-defiend china (discussing the origin
of the G-2 idea and its demise).
230. See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, China and US. Pledge Climate Teamwork, N.Y. TIMES DOT
EARTH BLOG (July 28, 2009, 6:19 PM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/china-and-us-
pledge-climate-teamwork/ (describing the July 2009 memorandum of understanding); Press Release,
White House, Office of Press Sec'y, U.S.-China Joint Statement (Nov. 17, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement (section "V. Climate Change,
Energy and Environment" of "U.S.-China Joint Statement" following President Obama's trip to China
in November 2009).
231. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 58 (discussing the importance of the S&ED
in this regard).
232. Hugh Gusterson, Secrecy, Authorship and Nuclear Weapons Scientists, in SECRECY AND
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 57, 69 (Judith Reppy ed., 1999),
www.einaudi.comell.edulpeaceprogram/publications/occasionalpapers/occasional-paper23.pdf (dis-
cussing the "intense secretiveness of the Soviet state").
233. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 58.
234. Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Electric Vehicles
Initiative (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.energy.gov/news2009/documents2009/US-
ChinaFactSheetElectricVehicles.pdf. For a skeptical view of this initiative, see Charlie McElwee,
Thin Gruel, CHINA ENVTL. L. (Nov. 19, 2009),
http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/2009/11/19/thin-gruel.
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tives. 235 The Clean Energy Ministerial Forum in July 2010, hosted by U.S.
Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and attended by his Chinese counterpart
and ministers from twenty-two other nations, outlined a multi-part agenda
in specific areas of cooperation. 236 Similar to Norway, which saw coopera-
tion in fishing matters cut off by an aggrieved China after the award of a
Nobel Prize to a Chinese dissident,237 the United States could find itself
shunned by China in these highly symbolic areas instead of cooperating
with it.
Some even argue (in obvious counterpoint to the USTR investiga-
tion) that China's subsidies and other programs to promote renewables can
be good for the United States' economy. 238 The Council on Foreign Rela-
tions' Michael Levi, examining the study cited earlier in this Article that
the United States retains leadership at the high value end of the solar devel-
opment and manufacturing chain,239 argues that "it's quite possible for the
United States and China both to win, with China lowering the cost of rela-
tively low-tech parts of the value chain, in turn growing the market for the
higher-tech parts that are still handled by the United States." 240 Levi com-
pares this to other situations in which China manufactures products devel-
oped in the United States. Some might find that overstated, and others cite
feedback loops like the one described earlier in this Article (in which Chi-
nese firms eventually find their way up the value chain). 241 On the other
hand, warring with China can only hurt the prospects for American firms to
do business in China.242
At the international level, greentech warring makes it even more diffi-
cult to reach a global climate agreement. Many have chastised China for
taking insufficient steps toward an agreement limiting greenhouse gas
235. See, e.g., Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum: A Global Response to the Challenge of
Climate Change, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/sequestration/cslf/ (last
updated June 23, 2010) (activities of the international Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum); see
generally CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 212 (calling for more bilateral cooperation on CCS
development).
236. Summary Fact Sheet, CLEAN ENERGY MINISTERIAL,
http://www.cleanenergyministerial.org/pdfs/CEM SummaryFactSheet.pdf (last updated July 23, 2010).
237. China Cancels More Visits After Nobel Award, EARTH TIMES (Oct. 13, 2010),
http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/news/348499,cancels-visits-nobel-award.html.
238. Plumer, supra note 208.
239. de la Tour, Glachant & M6nibre, supra note 83.
240. Michael Levi, The Downside to Made in the USA, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Sept. 9, 2010,
http://blogs.cfr.org/levil2010/09/09/the-downside-to-made-in-the-usa/.
241. Alan S. Brown, Manufacturing at the Crossroads, MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, June 2010,
available at http://memagazine.asme.org/Articles/2010/June/ManufacturingCrossroads.cfi.




emissions. According to some accounts, China's foot-dragging 243 and re-
fusal to adopt binding reduction targets was at least in part responsible for
the failure of the Copenhagen Accord to incorporate global binding lim-
its,244 although the United States shares some blame for putting forth a
weak negotiating position. As China's economy continues its rapid growth,
there will be even greater demand for it to agree to limit emissions.245 Cas-
tigating it for its greentech policies could foster a climate of distrust and
delay further progress on a post-Kyoto agreement. For example, it would
not take much for Senators who oppose international climate agreements to
blame the Chinese as a reason for refusing to agree to any such agreement
(a prerequisite for it to go into effect in the United States), 246 as they al-
ready have done once before with a resolution opposing ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol. 247 The rhetoric of a green energy race could give cover for
this regrettable posturing.
For all of these reasons, the symbolism of the space race and "climate
security" is simply not helpful in a discussion of global climate change.
Should we abandon any effort to invoke that bygone era? In the next Part, I
will argue that we should learn important lessons as a nation from the ac-
tual trajectory of the program of technology development and deployment
that responded to Sputnik and eventually put a man on the moon at the end
of the 1960s.
II. LESSONS FOR ENERGY POLICY FROM THE "SPACE RACE"
Huntsville, which had dubbed itself "Rocket City USA," was learning
the harsh reality of the military industrial complex: with the stroke of a
243. China has "associated with" (agreed in principle to) the Copenhagen Accord. On the other
hand, it believes "it is neither viable nor acceptable to start a new negotiating process," a stance which
would reverse years of international work. Arthur Max, China, India Join Copenhagen Accord, Last
Major Emitters To Sign On, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2010, 2:24 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/09/china-india-join-copenhagn_491640.html (comments of
Premier Wen Jiaboa).
244. See, e.g., Mark Lynas, How Do I Know China Wrecked the Copenhagen Deal? I Was in the
Room, GUARDIAN (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-
climate-change-mark-lynas. Lynas' argument was criticized by many who believed it unwise to ascribe
sole blame to the Chinese.
245. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 34 (noting that if China develops at its
current pace, "international concerns over global warming would increasingly be directed toward
China").
246. "If China isn't willing to translate domestic policy and goals into international commitments,
[Senators] won't support US participation in a Copenhagen treaty." Charlie McElwee, The Climate
Group Preaches Revolution, CHINA ENVTL. L. (Aug. 21, 2009),
http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/2009/08/21/the-climate-group-preaches-revolution.
247. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (adopted by a unanimous vote of 95-0, which was justified
in part on the rationale that the United States would be required to reduce emissions while India and
China would not).
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pen in Washington, entire communities could be wiped out as quickly as
they were created. 248
Avoiding missteps similar to those made in the pre-Sputnik climate
for space programs in the United States may be more rewarding than point-
ing the rhetorical finger at China. Blaming China merely deflects attention
from our own inabilities to develop progressive policies on renewables and
climate change. Instead of looking outward to China and chastising it for its
energy development and deployment policies, we should look inward at
ourselves, as we did in our own response to the space race. The reasons for
this are complex but well worth examining.
Support for our space programs was much more forthcoming after the
launch of Sputnik than before it. We cannot rewrite that story, but we can
avoid another one like it in greentech. In many respects, the federal gov-
ernment's support of greentech is no stronger than its support for the space
program at the time of the Sputnik launch. Bold action is needed to tran-
scend that gap. The 1961 announcement that the United States intended to
put a man on the moon was not the beginning of the space program but a
continuation and refocusing of its purpose. Similarly, I argue that the effort
to develop greentech in the United States requires a national goal as ambi-
tious as the moon shot, and as calculated to draw maximum popular atten-
tion.
A. Technology Development in the Space Race
The story of rocket technology development in the United States dur-
ing the pre-Sputnik era has been well documented, 249 and I will describe it
only briefly. During the post-World War II era, the Air Force and Army
(and, to a lesser extent, the Navy) worked to develop rockets capable of
carrying missiles into space that could threaten the U.S.S.R. or retaliate
after an attack. At one point there were six different missile programs under
development, each with different purposes. The unnecessary duplication
stemmed in part from overreaction to fear of the Soviets. 250 The missile
programs faced numerous hurdles, including institutional resistance. Key
Air Force personnel believed that missiles were not the technology of the
future, for "although the ICBM had ushered in a new age of warfare, the
248. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 102, at 162.
249. See, e.g., BRZEZINSKI, supra note 102, at 45-59; ROBERT A. DIVINE, THE SPUTNIK
CHALLENGE: EISENHOWER'S RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET SATELLITE (1993); WALTER A. MCDOUGALL,
THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SPACE AGE (1985); YORK, supra note
203.
250. YORK, supra note 203, at 116.
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Air Force did not convert entirely to missiles, persisting in the belief that a
manned aircraft was the 'proper' vehicle for the service." 251
Herbert York (the Defense Department's Director of Defense Re-
search and Engineering in the space race era) and Matthew Brzezinski,
among others, describe inter-service rivalrieS252 that contributed to "com-
petition for scientists, facilities, and funding." 253 York writes that Wernher
von Braun and General John Bruce Medaris maneuvered in a practically
"subversive" way to keep the Army's Jupiter program alive. 254 At one
point, they disregarded a higher-level decision to transfer missile program
responsibility to the Air Force and continued work on their Jupiter C.255
This bravado was "hailed and rewarded after the fact,"256 when the Army's
rocket was the first to successfully launch an American satellite into space.
Throughout the pre-Sputnik era, there was a lack of central coordina-
tion of scientific research and of missile development. York states that the
"Office of the Secretary of Defense, too new, too small, and too weak,
could not keep things under control." 257 In the early 1950s, high-level
scientific advice to the President was also lacking and thought to be unim-
portant. 258 As late as 1957, President Eisenhower could state that he
"hadn't given thought to any proposal to establish a scientist in a policy
position in the White House or Cabinet." 259
In the early to mid-1950s, the federal government preached austerity
in defense funding, led by Secretary of Defense Wilson and President Ei-
senhower, who was skeptical of the "military-industrial complex." Warn-
ings about missile preparedness sparked governmental action, including the
report of the 1954 Strategic Missiles Evaluation Group, known colloquially
as the "Teapot Committee." 260 However, funding was constrained by the
251. Neufeld, supra note 144.
252. The Air Force's Western Development Division focused on the Atlas and other missiles, but
competed with the Jupiter program underway at the Army's Huntsville, Alabama arsenal under the
leadership of the expatriate rocket scientist Wemher von Braun. YORK, supra note 203, at 126-135; see
also BRZEZINSKI, supra note 102, at 52.
253. Neufeld, supra note 144.
254. See YORK, supra note 203, at 135 ("Whether the achievement of launching thirty-one pounds
in January, 1958, with Juno I justified the almost subversive actions necessary to do so is something
which, in retrospect, I am not at all sure about. This kind of clever maneuvering in which ambitious
men work out ways of getting around the restraints imposed by a higher authority, including authority at
the constitutional level, goes on all the time in all the services . . .
255. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 102, at 52.
256. YORK, supra note 203, at 135.
257. Id. at 125.
258. ROGER PIELKE, JR. & ROBERTA KLEIN, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SCIENCE ADVISOR TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (2009).
259. Id.
260. Neufeld, supra note 144.
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Eisenhower administration's 1956 reductions in research and development
that had the effect of reducing the number of missiles to be developed and
stretching out the deployment schedule.
Sputnik's launch changed everything. 261 As York notes, "[a]fter the
first shock, strong reactions set in at all levels and in most segments of
American society." Numerous House and Senate Committees held hearings
intended to discover where we had gone wrong.262 The executive branch
focused on creating or realigning agencies and organizations to better serve
the objectives of getting America into space. Ironically, a Senate committee
had discussed all of these ideas one year earlier, "but Sputnik had not yet
happened and so they evoked very little response at that time." 263
All three military services, the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA, a precursor to today's NASA), and even the Atomic
Energy Commission vied for a leadership role. Two major actions were the
1957 elevation of science to a near-Cabinet level position, and the 1958
creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The
Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, a crea-
ture of the Korean War, became the President's Science Advisory Commit-
tee (PSAC). 264 The PSAC's mandate was to "see to it that those projects
which experts judge have the highest potential shall advance with the ut-
most speed." 265 York writes that "without PSAC the United States in the
first frantic responses to the shock of the Russian successes [we] would
have undertaken a larger number of ill-advised programs in a more disor-
ganized fashion than we actually did."266
Despite this advance, funding for space projects was still clouded in
uncertainty. Overall spending increased significantly after Sputnik's
launch, but "the increase in the number of independent claimants for funds
only served to confuse things." 267 York states that:
261. See, e.g., Wilford, supra note 102 (quoting historian Walter McDougall who stated that "[n]o
event since Pearl Harbor set off such repercussions in public life").
262. YORK, supra note 203, at 112 ("The Senate and the House of Representatives created new
special committees for similar purposes. The Senate Armed Services Committee, its Preparedness
Subcommittee, the Government Operations Committees, the powerful Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, and others all held extensive hearings for the purpose of examining the situation in detail.").
263. YORK, supra note 203, at 121. One interesting recommendation is analogous to proposals
today regarding climate: boosting the resources allocated to scientific education. "PTA's and school
boards and university trustees all came to the conclusion that inadequacies in the quality and quantity of
science education were the root causes of the whole mess. And as a result the status and salary of nearly
all science teachers and professors markedly improved." Id. at 113.
264. PIELKE & KLEIN, supra note 258.
265. Id. (quoting President Dwight D. Eisenhower)
266. YORK, supra note 203, at 116.
267. Id. at 125.
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Each of the services, inspired both by genuine patriotic concern and by
self-interest, hoped to take advantage of the public confusion and con-
sternation over Sputnik. Supported by its coterie of contractors and spe-
cial supporting organizations, each intensified its campaign against the
other two and against the higher authorities that were trying to restrain
the outburst. The battles were fought on the speaking podium, in the kept
technological press, and before the committees of Congress.268
When Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first person to fly in
space in 1961, Vice President Johnson (acting on advice from many, in-
cluding Dr. von Braun) advised Kennedy that the United States had largely
failed to marshal its resources adequately to compete with the U.S.S.R. in
space flight. 269 He concluded that "[w]e are neither making maximum ef-
fort nor achieving results necessary if this country is to reach a position of
[space] leadership." 270 Months later, Kennedy announced his support for
the Apollo program.271
The announcement that the United States aimed to put a man on the
moon by the end of the 1960s is often viewed as the start of a process that
led to a great national success. 272 What that account leaves out, however, is
that the events leading up to Kennedy's announcement show that we were
still continuing to work our way out of the hole we had dug in the 1950s.
After Sputnik, we discovered that we had devoted woeful amounts to satel-
lite research and development, that governmental agencies had competed
with each other (which delayed positive developments), and that there was
inadequate coordination of space programs throughout the government.
The process of reversing those shortcomings took many years.
B. Parallels to the Present Day
Our snapshot of America's science and technology efforts in 1957
highlights poor levels of support for space research and development, com-
bined with a resistance in the military to shift resources from core missions
(flying manned bombers, fighting enemies on the ground). Only in retros-
pect did we see that governmental support, early, often, and consistent, was
crucial to the development of the space program. That insight translates to
greentech in two ways. First is that we need governmental involvement of
the same sort to catalyze development of our greentech sector. Second, and
268. Id. at 126.
269. Memorandum from Lyndon B. Johnson, Memorandum for the President, Evaluation of Space
Program (Apr. 28, 1961), available at http://history.nasa.gov/Apollomon/apollo2.pdf.
270. Id.
271. Wilford, supra note 102.
272. See, e.g., id.
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more crucially important, is that if we do not devote the resources now, we
will regret it later.
In greentech, we have spent decades repeating the mistake of the
1950s space program. National energy policy may not feature the Sputnik-
era drama of levels of bureaucracy fighting with one another, with separate
branches of the military furtively pursuing duplicative programs. On the
other hand, numerous observers have noted that we lack a stable set of
policies to encourage greentech research, development, and deployment. 273
While we have done well to invent new technologies, 274 our efforts to ad-
vance them to the commercial stage and promote their deployment are
"fragmented," spread among numerous agencies, and lacking coordina-
tion.275 A number of plans and reports produced since late 2008 to influ-
ence the incoming Obama administration detailed the need for a
transformation of our energy policy with, among other policies, an in-
creased attention to renewables. 276
As many have noted, "[g]overnment policies can provide a strong im-
petus for constructing renewable generation facilities," and there is a wide
variety of potential incentives, including support for research and develop-
ment, tax incentives, government procurement policies, renewable portfolio
standards (RPSs), carbon cap-and-trade programs, and feed-in tariffs.277
Federal spending on renewable energy is both anemic in its overall levels
(having declined in real terms since 1980)278 and, even after the added
273. Wong, supra note 60 (noting that "[t]he United States risks falling behind China, as well as
other Asian and EU countries, because of its failure to create a long-term vision for clean energy devel-
opment and a stable policy framework to realize that vision").
274. Id. (noting that "the United States has been tremendously successful in inventing many impor-
tant clean energy technologies, but has faired [sic] less well in mass production and commercialization
relative to the size of its economy").
275. See, e.g., David L. Levy, The Political Economy of Renewable Energy in the US and Europe,
ALL ACAD. RES.,
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/pmla-apa-research-citation/0/7/2/5/7/pages72573/p72573- .php
(last visited Oct. 6, 2010) (observing that "[renewables] policy in the US is characterized by fragmenta-
tion, uncertainty, lack of coordination, a lack of substantive taxes or subsidies, and the absence of a
meaningful overall emissions reduction target").
276. See JEFFREY LOGAN & TED L. JAMES, A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF A DOZEN NATIONAL
ENERGY PLANS: Focus ON RENEWABLE AND EFFICIENT ENERGY (2009), available at
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/45046.pdf (analyzing twelve such plans).
277. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory and the Pew Center on Global Climate Change,
among many others, have issued numerous publications on the link between governmental policies and
promotion of renewables. See NREL Publications, Nat'l Renewable Energy Laboratory,
http://www.nrel.gov/publications/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2010); PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 186. A recent noteworthy report in the author's home region is Marilyn A. Brown
et al., Renewable Energy in the South: A Policy Brief (Ga. Inst. of Tech., Sch. of Pub. Pol'y 2010,
Working Paper No. 58, 2010), available at www.spp.gatech.edulfaculty/workingpapers/wp58.pdf.
278. FRED SIsStN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22858, RENEWABLE ENERGY R&D FUNDING
HISTORY: A COMPARISON WITH FUNDING FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY, FOSSIL ENERGY, AND ENERGY
EFFICIENCY R&D (2008), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22858.pdf.
2011] 55
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
billions of dollars in spending in the 2009 stimulus package, 279 well behind
that devoted to fossil fuels.280 Federal tax policy for renewables is inconsis-
tently supportive, 281 and the result is that in some years, many new projects
come to fruition, but the pipeline often dries up. 282 The American Wind
Energy Association observed in 2010 that the pace of installations boomed
in 2009,283 but slowed in 2010 when stimulus package funds dried up. The
cyclical pace of support "clearly illustrates the consequences of on-again,
off-again short-term federal incentives for wind as a market signal." 284
Some of the Obama administration's actions in response to our lag in
promoting renewables are similar to actions taken in response to Sputnik,
such as the creation of a Cabinet-level position to address climate change,
which echoes governmental reorganizations taken in the late 1950s. One
action that is especially comparable and noteworthy is the funding of the
Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) with $400 million
from the ARRA stimulus package. ARPA-E's name and mission delibe-
rately echo that of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) 285
created after Sputnik in the Department of Defense.
The moon landing was the product of an amalgamation of many dispa-
rate efforts to develop different types of technologies. So too is energy
279. See Amanda Ruggeri, What the Stimulus Package Does for Renewable Energy, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Mar. 6, 2009), http://politics.usnews.com/news/energy/articles/2009/03/06/what-the-
stimulus-package-does-for-renewable-energy.html (noting that the package contained "about $50
billion in spending and $20 billion in tax provisions"); Daniel J. Weiss & Alexandra Kougentakis,
Recovery Plan Captures the Energy Opportunity, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 13, 2009),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/02/recoveryplan-captures.html (linking to a compre-
hensive spreadsheet detailing individual programs and provisions); see also Joe Romm, The Entire
American Economy, Including Renewable Energy, Benefitted from the Stimulus Bill, CLIMATE
PROGRESS (Aug. 25, 2010), http://climateprogress.org/2010/08/25/the-entire-american-economy-
including-renewable-energy-benefited-from-the-stimulus-bill (discussing the impact of the stimulus
package on the economy, including promotion of greentech).
280. See Zachary Shahan, Fossil Fuels Get Tons More in Subsidies than Renewable Energy,
CLEAN TECHNICA (July 31, 2010), http://cleantechnica.com/2010/07/31/fossil-fuels-get-tons-more-in-
subsidies-than-renewable-energy/ (noting that governments devote more than ten times as much to
subsidizing fossil fuel industries than to solar and wind).
281. Romm, supra note 279 (discussing the potential for tax incentives to expire at the end of
2010).
282. Candace Lombardi, US. Wind Energy Popular, But Lacks Investment, CNET NEWS (July 28,
2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-20011926-54.html?tag-mncol;mltrelated.
283. Global Wind Power Boom Continues Despite Economic Woes, GLOBAL WIND ENERGY
COUNCIL (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.gwec.net/index.php?id=30&tx-ttnews[tt news]=247 (comments
of AWEA's CEO Denise Bode that "[t]he U.S. wind energy industry shattered all installation records in
2009, chalking up the Recovery Act as a historic success in creating jobs, avoiding carbon, and protect-
ing consumers").
284. AWEA MID-YEAR 2010 MARKET REPORT: JULY 2010, supra note 31, at 3.
285. Angelique van Engelen, Obama Addresses Climate Change in Program Styled on 1960s
Space Race, GLOBAL WARMING IS REAL (May 5, 2009),
http://www.globalwarmingisreal.com/blog/2009/05/05/obama-addresses-climate-change-in-program-
styled-on-I 950s-space-race/.
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research and development. Like the Apollo program, it is not clear at the
outset which technology will prevail, so we need to work on a variety of
fronts over a long period of time. ARPA-E's focus on stimulating research
and development of risky new technologies may well be excellent for this
purpose, but the initial $400 million support is a drop in the bucket com-
pared to the levels needed. Programs established in the stimulus package
are a temporary fix and not the comprehensive approach that we need. 286
At present, it has become apparent that much of the rest of our effort
to develop national targets for greentech is mired in a rut. No climate bill
with a price on carbon (through an economy-wide or more limited trading
scheme), a renewable electricity standard, or a national feed-in tariff is
likely to be forthcoming from the Congress. 287 Progress toward even the
more limited goal of a stand-alone national renewable electricity standard
is doubtful.288 Many have noted the failure of federal leadership 289 and the
actions of a number of progressive states that have stepped into the void
with their own programs. 290 These policies are not uniformly available
throughout the country. Also, a national program (such as a national re-
newable portfolio standard) may achieve results that piecemeal state and
regional efforts underway cannot. 291
How can we make more progress? The moon project offers a way of
looking at this. Indeed, the idea of a domestic challenge like that of sending
a man to the moon may well be more of what those talking about a "clean
energy race" actually mean than following China's lead. Addressing cli-
mate change requires the kind of committed and strong support from the
federal government that the space program received throughout the
1960s. 292 The race is really a race to meet a national goal that we have
articulated and that is in our national self-interest, whether or not it has
geopolitical significance.
286. Wong, supra note 109.
287. David Roberts, On the Death of the Climate Bill, GRIST MAGAZINE, July 22, 2010,
http://www.grist.org/article/2010-07-22-on-the-death-of-the-climate-bill/.
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., Wong, supra note 60 (noting that "[w]hat the United States has instead is a pat-
chwork of differing state and local policies paired with federal policy tools that are temporary and
unpredictable").
290. For descriptions of the wide variety of state programs, see US. States & Regions, PEW CTR.
ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewelimate.org/states-regions (last visited Oct. 6, 2010),
and JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33812, CLIMATE CHANGE: ACTION BY
STATES TO ADDRESS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2007), available at
http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Dec/RL33812.pdf.
291. See Lincoln Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1339, 1397 (2010); Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a Na-
tional Renewable Portfolio Standard on the US. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49, 61 (2008).
292. Engelen, supra note 285.
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We put a man on the moon in part because we were captivated by the
idea of a simple, clear goal. Previously, I have argued for a clear goal in
renewables. I believe that a new form of governmental assistance is re-
quired beyond feed-in tariffs, tax credits and rebates, solar power purchase
agreements, and property tax financing. 293 I have focused on a platform for
discussing one idea that could catalyze a push toward rapidly increasing
development of renewables: a "solar utility" that would reduce the upfront
cost of panels to nearly zero by subsidizing and installing them at hous-
es. 294
A cautionary tale from the past is in order. In 1978, President Jimmy
Carter articulated a goal of generating 20% of the nation's electricity from
renewable sources by 2000, which, of course, is comparable to RPS levels
being discussed now. Follow-through on that goal was poor, as Congress
rejected many of the individual programs designed to achieve the goal and
fossil fuel industries marshaled their resources to prevent the advancement
of renewables industries. 295The current era features stronger support for
renewable energy and may be more promising for achieving a national
goal. If we focus national attention on a concrete goal, like "a solar panel
on every house," intermediate technology and policy milestones are easier
to achieve because they are in service of the purpose.
CONCLUSION
Can we please retire this rhetoric? Both countries have their strengths
and can make unique contributions to our shared goal. Let's stop fighting
a war where both sides believe they are the losers. 296
China has become a major player in greentech in a short amount of
time. If it could keep up its breakneck pace of growth it might look like it
has pulled far ahead of us in the new "green energy race," but at present the
picture is more muddled. The "space race" metaphor and the USTR inves-
tigation are counterproductive in that they pit the two nations against each
other, when they should emphasize interdependence and cooperation. In the
end, competing with China in greentech is about as useful as "energy inde-
pendence." It may be much more productive to convince Americans that
their nation's future depends on investment in renewables through a specif-
ic national goal.
293. Eisen, supra note 13, at 2.
294. Id. at 3.
295. Richard Rosentreter, Oil, ProfitS, and the Question of Alternative Energy, HUMANIST, Sept.-
Oct. 2000, at 8, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi ml374/is 5_60/ai_6513303 1/.
296. McElwee, supra note 24.
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